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Security of vehicular platooning
by
Soodeh Dadras, Doctor of Philosophy
Utah State University, 2019
Major Professor: Chris Winstead, Ph.D.
Department: Electrical and Computer Engineering
This dissertation investigates the security of vehicular platooning. It describes the
critical challenges in security with a focus on the vulnerabilities of vehicle platooning and
points out that exploiting these drawbacks can cause oscillations and collisions in the pla-
toon. These security issues could prove particularly disruptive and dangerous in vehicular
platooning by causing severe injuries, a delay in system performance or increase in fuel
consumption. This research focuses on the design, detection, and mitigation of attacks in
a vehicle platoon. To achieve the secure design, we introduce the possible attacks, that can
be implemented by exploiting weaknesses of the platooning algorithms. Furthermore, we
explore the attacker’s capability to disrupt the typical performance of the platoon which
includes the attacker’s control over vehicle formation via motion modification and change
in control law. Then, we propose a detection algorithm which can identify the attacker in
the platoon as a primary step for mitigating the impact of control modification attack in
the platoon. In the end, we aim at proposing a resilient scheme which would protect the
platoon against undesirable impacts of the attack, like platoon disintegration, collisions,




Security of vehicular platooning
Soodeh Dadras
Platooning concept involves a group of vehicles acting as a single unit through coordi-
nation of movements. While Platooning as an evolving trend in mobility and transportation
diminishes the individual and manual driving concerns, it creates new risks. New technolo-
gies and passenger’s safety and security further complicate matters and make platooning
attractive target for the malicious minds. To improve the security of the vehicular pla-
tooning, threats and their potential impacts on vehicular platooning should be identified to
protect the system against security risks. Furthermore, algorithms should be proposed to
detect intrusions and mitigate the effects in case of attack. This dissertation introduces a
new vulnerability in vehicular platooning from the control systems perspective and presents
the detection and mitigation algorithms to protect vehicles and passengers in the event of
the attack.
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CHAPTER 1
Introduction
Since the number of vehicles and vehicular traffic have significantly grown worldwide,
platooning has become a topic of considerable interest and has motivated much research
in this field. The platooning concept involves a group of vehicles traveling together as
shown in Fig. 1.1 to maintain minimum spacing and relative velocity with one leader in
the front position for velocity and trajectory reference. Goals for platoon establishment are
maximizing highways throughput, greater commuting speeds, enhancing traveling quality
and safety in highways, and minimizing fuel consumption [6].
Many companies and projects have been actively involved in vehicle platooning like
SARTRE a European platooning project [120]; PATH a California traffic automation
program that includes platooning [129]; GCDC a cooperative driving initiative in the
Netherlands [103], SCANIA platooning [6] and; Energy ITS a Japanese truck platoon-
ing project [135]. The focus of this work will be on security in platooning control and
communication.
Fig. 1.1: A platooning scenario
1.1 Platoon Control Design
Platoon control can be put in two categories; First, when vehicles are moving in straight
2
line, longitudinal control is taking care of small spacing and zero relative velocity between
vehicles. Second, lateral control prevents unwanted changing lanes and cutting corners for
all kind of trajectories [89]. It is worth noting that this work only studies longitudinal
control.







where p, v, and u are the position, velocity and control input respectively and M is vehicle
mass.
Since the emergence of platooning concept, there have been many pieces of research that
pursue and support the platooning goal. The most researched area in driving automation
is the vehicle string, stability, and string stability. String stability plays an important role
in performance of vehicle formation. A vehicle string is string stable in case of disturbance
injection if the error in spacing will attenuate toward the end of the platoon and vehicle
distances remain bounded [115,125].
1.1.1 Platoon strategies
Two strategies are used to control the spacing between vehicles: constant spacing and
variable spacing.
Variable spacing usually does not require a lot of data from other vehicles. In addition,
it can ensure string stability using onboard information only, but inter-vehicle distances
vary with the velocity and can be very large, hence traffic density is low. Constant Time
Headway (CTH) is the simplest and most common variable spacing policy. Variable time
headway can vary linearly with the velocity, with the relative velocity, or even with vehicle
dynamics and road conditions.
Constant spacing can achieve both string stability and high traffic density, sometimes
at the cost of inter-vehicle communications. In the Constant Spacing control strategies, the
3
desired inter-vehicle spacing is independent of the velocity of the controlled vehicle. The
tracking requirement is stringent since every controlled vehicle has to match its position,
velocity, and acceleration with the vehicle ahead. As a consequence, these strategies require
more information to guarantee performance. The achievable traffic capacity is very high
in a constant spacing control strategy. There are several solutions for constant spacing
strategy: control with information of lead and preceding vehicles, control with information
of preceding vehicle (unidirectional), control with information of preceding and following
vehicles (bidirectional) are shown in Fig. 1.2 - 1.4 where the arrows show the direction of
the information flow [132] and numbering order is from the left side to the right side of the
platoons shown in Figs 1.2 - 1.4.
Fig. 1.2: Leader-Predecessor information flow in platoon
Fig. 1.3: Unidirectional information flow in platoon
Once sufficient information is gathered to understand the state of the vehicle with
respect to other vehicles, a control scheme is required. Longitudinal control of platoon
has been the topic of many articles [89]; PID control law for longitudinal control of lead
4
Fig. 1.4: Bidirectional information flow in platoon
vehicle was proposed in [68]. State feedback linearizion used for the control of platoon
movement for nonlinear vehicle model in [126]. A simple PD control algorithm is considered
in [142] and [59] for different strategies in a platoon where they analyzed platoon as a set of
connected mass-spring-damper. In [63] collision avoidance scheme is combined with second-
order sliding mode controller where bicycle model vehicles form a platoon. The problem
of stability of a vehicle string in the presence of parametric uncertainty is addressed and a
Lyapunov-based decentralized adaptive control algorithm to compensate for such parametric
variations is presented in [133]. The sliding surface method of controller design is utilized
in [118] to guarantee string stability and minimum spacing for leader predecessor strategy.
Combined throttle/brake control algorithm using a modified sliding control method designed
to control inter-vehicle spacing within a fully automated platoon of vehicles in [76]. The
longitudinal control of the vehicles [85] is PD control based on the inter-vehicle distance
measured by the laser radar and calculated from the localization data transmitted from the
preceding vehicle over the intercommunications. The authors adopt a third-order vehicle
model and applied a Lyapunov control method [111] where Lyapunov function is derived
based on expected spacing error. In recent years, some advanced platoon control laws
have been proposed under the framework of multi-agent consensus control [140], [52] and
[122]. Distributed control of a platoon of vehicles with nonlinear dynamics using distributed
receding horizon control algorithms is presented in [56] and [57]. Linear and nonlinear event
triggered based control are proposed in [93] where every vehicle broadcasts its position and
velocity information only at discrete event times and these events are determined by a
trigger rule that depends only on the agent’s state and time.
5
This work is mainly based on work presented in [142] where PD control was proposed
for different types of information flow in the platoon. The problems which are going to be
discussed in this work involve bidirectional, leader-follower and unidirectional with constant
time headway information flow where system models are presented in absolute coordinates
in equations (1.2), (1.4) and (1.6) and error coordinates in equations (1.3), (1.5) and (1.7).
Platooning model for bidirectional flow of information are presented in (1.2) and (1.3)
in absolute and error coordinate frames.
ẋ1 = v1
v̇1 = kpn(x2 − x1 − d) + kdn(v2 − v1)
ẋ2 = v2
v̇2 = kpn(x3 − 2x2 + x1) + kdn(v3 − 2v2 + v1)
...
ẋi = vi





ẏ1 = −2kpz1 + kpz2 − (kd)y1 + kdy2
ż2 = y2
ẏ2 = kpz1 − 2kpz2 + kpz3 + kdy1 − 2kdy2 + kdy3
...
żn−2 = yn−2
ẏn−2 = kpzn−3 − 2kpzn−2 + kpzn−1 + kdyn−3 − 2kdyn−2 + kdyn−1
żn−1 = yn−1
ẏn−1 = kpzn−2 − kpzn−1 + kdyn−2 − kdyn−1 − u
(1.3)
6
Platooning model for leader-predecessor flow of information are presented in (1.4) and
(1.5) in absolute and error coordinate frame.
ẋ1 = v1
v̇1 = kpn(x2 − x1 − d) + kdn(v2 − v1) + kbn(vl − v1)
ẋ2 = v2
v̇2 = kpn(x3 − 2x2 + x1) + kdn(v3 − 2v2 + v1 + kbn(vl − v2))
...
ẋn−1 = vi





ẏ1 = −kpz1 + kpz2 − (kd)y1 + kdy2 + kbny1
ż2 = y2
ẏ2 = −kpz2 + kpz3 − kdy2 + kdy3 + kbny2
...
żn−2 = yn−2
ẏn−2 = −kpzn−2 + kpzn−1 − kdyn−2 + kdyn−1 + kbnyn−2
żn−1 = yn−1
ẏn−1 = −kpzn−1 − kdyn−1 + kbnyn−1 − u
(1.5)
Platooning model for unidirectional flow of information with constant time headway
are presented in (1.6) and (1.7) in absolute and error coordinate frame.
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ẋ1 = v1
v̇1 = kpn(x2 − x1 − hv1) + kdn(v2 − v1)
ẋ2 = v2
v̇2 = kpn(x3 − x2 − hv2) + kdn(v3 − v2)
...
ẋn−1 = vi





ẏ1 = −kpz1 + kpz2 − (kd)y1 + kdy2 − kphy1
ż2 = y2
ẏ2 = −kpz2 + kpz3 − kdy2 + kdy3 − kphy2
...
żn−2 = yn−2
ẏn−2 = −kpzn−2 + kpzn−1 − kdyn−2 + kdyn−1 − kphyn−2
żn−1 = yn−1
ẏn−1 = −kpzn−1 − kdyn−1 − kphyn−1yn−1 − u
(1.7)
Where x, v, and v̇ represent a vehicle’s position, velocity, and acceleration, respectively,
kpn and kdn the proportional and derivative control gains which are the same for all vehicles
for the purpose of simplicity they would refer to as kp and kd. Desired spacing between
every two vehicles is considered as d. vl is desired platoon velocity (broadcasted by the
system infrastructure or platoon leader) and kbn the associated control gain for relative
velocity between vehicle and the leader, and h is the constant time headway for variable
spacing term. un is the control input to the leader where it can follow the same rule as
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other vehicles in platoon or be zero in normal platooning condition (where there is no
attack in the system). The constant time headway is necessary for the input to the leader
in unidirectional with constant time headway to form the error coordinate form. The last
vehicle would be referred as the first vehicle and the leader would the nth vehicle. i is the
vehicle number. Model in absolute coordinates can be transformed into error coordinates
by defining two new variables as spacing zi = xi+1 − xi − d and yi = vi+1 − vi.
The equivalent state-space representation of the linear time-invariant (LTI) system for
(1.2), (1.4) and (1.6) defined by (1.8).
ẋ = Anx +Bnu
y = Cnx
(1.8)
Where x = [x1, v1, x2, v2, · · · , xn, vn]T ∈ R2n are the states of all the vehicles in the
platoon, An ∈ R2n×2n, Bn ∈ R2n×1, Cn ∈ R2n×2n. Cn is the identity matrix (because it is
assumed that all the vehicle states are measurable), Bn has non-zero entries corresponding
to the leader, un, and u = [un], for the bidirectional and unidirectional with constant
time headway. In leader-predecessor information flow, Bn ∈ R2n×2 has non-zero entries
corresponding to the leader, un and desired velocity vl, and u = [un Vl]
ᵀ.
The equivalent state-space representation of the linear time-invariant (LTI) system for
(1.3), (1.5) and (1.7) defined by (1.9).
ẋe = Aexe +Beu
ye = Cexe
(1.9)
Where xe = [z1, y1, z2, y2, · · · , zn−1, vn−1]T ∈ R2n−2 are the states of all the vehicles
in the platoon, Ae ∈ R2n−2×2n−2, Be ∈ R2n−2×1, Ce ∈ R2n−2×2n−2. Ce is the identity matrix
(because it is assumed that all the vehicle states are measurable), Be has non-zero entries
corresponding to the leader, un, and u = [un] for the bidirectional and unidirectional with
constant time headway. In leader-predecessor information flow Be ∈ R2n−2×2 has non-zero
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entries corresponding to the leader, un and desired velocity vl, and u = [un vl]
ᵀ.
1.2 Vehicular Communication network
The information required in each control scenario is provided via onboard sensing like
(Radar/Lidar, Camera and Global Positioning System (GPS) ) or vehicular communica-
tion. A key enabling technology of Intelligent Transportation System (ITS) is wireless
communication, covering Vehicle-to-Vehicle (V2V), Vehicle-to-Infrastructure (V2I), and
Infrastructure-to-Vehicle (I2V) communications. Collectively, these wireless transactions
are referred to as Vehicle-to-everything (V2x) communication are relied on the band of 5.9
GHz (5.85− 5.925GHz).
V2x communication, which involves vehicles exchanging data with each other and the
infrastructure for the initial purpose of driver awareness, disseminate warnings and provide
real-time traffic information which are well aligned with the capabilities of the technology
and has proven to improve traffic safety and increase the efficiency of transportation systems
[72]. IEEE 802.11p is an approved amendment to the IEEE 802.11 standard to add wireless
access in vehicular environments (WAVE), a vehicular communication system and it defines
enhancements to 802.11 (the basis of products marketed as Wi-Fi) required to support
Intelligent ITS applications. IEEE 802.11p was designed, from the beginning, to meet every
V2x application requirement with the most stringent performance specifications. In 1999,
the U.S. Federal Communications Commission (FCC) set aside 75 MHz of bandwidth, in
the 5.9 GHz region, for V2x, and the IEEE 802.11p standard operates within this range [84].
United States, Europe, and Japan are the main countries that proposed protocols for
standardization landscape for wireless vehicular communication. Dedicated Short Range
Communications (DSRC), which is based on IEEE 802.11p, has been the subject of exten-
sive standardization, product development and field trials by many providers, proving its
benefit for V2x after it was granted in 2009. Each DSRC-equipped vehicle broadcasts its
basic state information, including location, speed, and acceleration, several times per sec-
ond over a range of a few hundred meters. Each vehicle also receives these safety messages
from DSRC-equipped neighbors. A receiving vehicle uses these messages to compute the
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trajectory of each neighbor, compares these with its own predicted path, and determines if
any of the neighbors poses a collision threat. In addition to V2V communication, vehicles
may also communicate to and from DSRC roadside units (RSUs) using safety messages
and other types of message. Examples of information a vehicle may learn from an RSU
include: the geometry of an approaching intersection, the state of the signals at an inter-
section, and the existence of a hazard (e.g., disabled vehicle, emergency vehicle, ice, fog).
The protocol stack for DSRC communication are briefly pointed out as follows: at the PHY
and MAC layers DSRC utilizes IEEE 802.11p Wireless Access for Vehicular Environments
(WAVE), a modified version of the familiar IEEE 802.11 (WiFi) standard. In the mid-
dle of the stack DSRC employs a suite of standards defined by the IEEE 1609 Working
Group: 1609.4 for Channel Switching, 1609.3 for Network Services (including the WAVE
Short Message ProtocolVWSMP), and 1609.2 for Security Services. DSRC also supports
use of well-known Internet protocols for the Network and Transport layers, i.e., Internet
Protocol version 6 (IPv6), User Datagram Protocol (UDP) and Transmission Control Pro-
tocol (TCP). These protocols, defined by the Internet Engineering Task Force (IETF) [88].
Meanwhile in Europe, they adopt ITS-G5 which like DSRC, operates in the 5.9 GHz band.
European spectrum allocation is sub-divided into part A to D like ITS-G5A with 30 MHz
for safety and traffic efficiency applications, ITS-G5B has 20 MHz for non-safety applica-
tion. DSCR and ITS-G5 are sharing the same key technology features of IEEE-802.11 for
the purpose of compatibility [58].
The network formed by 802.11p compliant devices is known as VANET (Vehicular Ad-
hoc NETwork) a subclass of Mobile Ad Hoc NETworks (MANETs). Vehicles in VANET
must be equipped with some sort of radio interface or OnBoard Unit (OBU) that enables
short-range wireless ad hoc networks to be formed. Vehicles must also be fitted with hard-
ware that permits detailed position information such as Global Positioning System (GPS)
or a Differential Global Positioning System (DGPS) receiver. VANET allows the cars to
connect to each other in 100 to 300 meters distant. Fixed RSUs, which are connected to
the backbone network, must be in place to facilitate communication [144].
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Although the works are numerous, there are still issues which may be untouched.
Specifically the security aspects of the VANET was not considered at the time of standard-
ization.
1.3 Related Works on Security issues in Platooning
Considering a vehicular platoon as the cyber-physical system, the platoon faces secu-
rity challenges like identifying threats and their countermeasures. Vehicle platoon can be
compromised from different aspects such as control and communication. There are many
research works investigating vulnerabilities in a platoon which mostly involve communi-
cation and network layer threats. The authors in [83] and [1] present complete surveys
on attacks that had been performed on communication links. In [3] counted attacks in 5
categories due to their threat to Availability, Confidentiality, Data integrity, Authentica-
tion and Non-repudiation where each issue and existent attacks in each domain studied in
detail. Authors address accessibility of information at any time to only designated group
of users as availability and confidentiality. Data integrity ensures the accuracy and con-
sistency of data from source to endpoint. Authentication as the first line of defense in
security would check for the trusted identity. Non-repudiation is the service which ensures
that the sending and the receiving parties of the data cannot deny its transmission and
reception in the case of dispute. One of most important attack on the network layer, denial
of service (DOS) attack is studied in [73] which compromise the availability of the data
over the network. Also, authors propose practical countermeasures to secure the VANET
and solve the problem causing by attacks. some threats to privacy in VANETs are dis-
cussed in [54]. Furthermore, it was pointed out that the degree of privacy depends on user
preferences, environmental settings, and application requirements and should therefore be
adjustable. [71] identifies internal and external threats to and vulnerabilities of autonomous
vehicles in order to identify cyber attacks and countermeasures using a risk management
approach. [50] designed a set of insider attacks and abnormal behaviors that occur in a pla-
toon of cars exploiting controller and proposed model-based detection scheme by comparing
DSRC (Dedicated Short Range Communications) messages and expected behavior where
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switches to non-cooperative ACC (Adaptive Cruise Control), relying solely on radar, to
mitigate the impact of the attack. Effects of security attacks on the communication chan-
nel as well as sensor tampering of a connected vehicle stream equipped to achieve CACC
(Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control) is studied in [2] and downgrading to ACC mode
is proposed as a potential countermeasure. [70] analyzes the effect of the wireless jammer
on the stability and the performance of vehicles in a platoon using a specific distributed
control algorithm. [28] proves that attacker can create instability or oscillation in platoon
using unstable gains. Active and passive attacks against the system are presented in [55]
where some members act in a malicious manner with the intent of destabilizing traffic flow.
Mitigation algorithm based on modifying an existing control scheme after attack detection
to sliding mode control proposed in [121]. The authors in [26] demonstrate their proposed
fractional based controller can prevent collisions and oscillation resulting from the attack.
Within the broader work on the security of cyber-physical systems (CPS), the authors
of [12] mention that CPSs are uniquely vulnerable to an attack that causes the system
to resonate (become unstable), which is one of the goals of the attacker (the other being
to wrest control of the platoon from the leader). They do not, however, describe an exact
mechanism for carrying out the attack (other than sensor or controller compromise), as such
an attack is specific the particular CPS under consideration. Barreto et al. [4] analyzed how
an attacker could affect a system, in terms of controllability and stability, when given control
over actuators and sensors.
Comparing to a large body of work accomplished in security in cyber physical systems,
little amount was specified to security of platoon from control perspective [23,28,50,55,121].
As the control system is a vital part to platooning and automated vehicles, identifying the
drawbacks and improving the resilience of this system seems very crucial. Platoon attacks
and mitigation algorithm till this date are considered to be model dependent [55] and [50]
and lack generality. [8] proposed false data injection attack does not seem quite effective
due to attackers limitation which makes the analysis of the attackers’ ability and evaluating
the efficiency of the attack essential.
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1.4 Significance of security in platooning, Contribution and Objectives
The daily increase in the number of vehicles traveling in highways and severity of the
injuries and fatalities by accidents, create a strong motivation for platoon formation. Ve-
hicular platooning is in developing phase. Several new applications are enabled by this
new technology. A brief overview of the control algorithm and vehicular network that are
involved in platooning are described in previous sections. However, as these applications
have impact in road traffic safety, strong security requirements must be achieved. Security
of platooning should be maintained in the highest level to protect lives of thousands of pas-
sengers traveling in vehicles involving in a platoon. New mechanisms have to be developed
to deal with the inherent features of vehicles formation for safe and secure performance.
Several sources state security as the top concern in platoon realization [9,77,119]. In order
to guarantee the reliable performance of platooning, the threats to the system should be
identified and resiliency against all adversities should be enhanced. The purpose of this
work is to emphasize that, apart from typical security needs (e.g. confidentiality), there are
other context-specific ones (e.g. trust assurance over reported data and algorithms modi-
fication), which require robust secure algorithms. Therefore, the contribution of this work
can be highlighted as potential challenges in autonomous vehicles platooning along with
fortifying algorithm which equally serve the security of platooning. The focus of this study
is provided as follows:
• Identifying threats to vehicle platooning control and vehicular network; where we
identify the vulnerability in the platooning control system and devise the destabilizing
attack for these systems.
• Investigating the impacts and limitations of the attacker in the platoon; where two
types of attacks, motion modification and integral attacks, are compared in terms of
their impact on platoon and the severity of the damages caused to the platoon under
the attack.
• Detection method utilizing system identification methods and anomaly detection is
applied to the platoon under the attack in order to locate the attacker(s) in the
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platoon.
• Mitigation scheme based on fractional order calculus is proposed to suppress malicious
behavior of the attacker compromising the platoon.
It has been detailed that the cybersecurity of autonomous vehicle platooning and their
supporting infrastructure is at risk due to security attack on the application layer, network
layer, system level, and privacy leakage attack and identifying vulnerabilities seems to be
crucial for this flourishing industry. When identified and analyzed, threats and vulnera-
bilities can be controlled by characterizing countermeasures to ensure that the associated
risks and their potential impacts following attacks are mitigated to an acceptable level. The
works presented in this dissertation are presented in:
”Dadras, S., Gerdes, R. M., and Sharma, R. (2015, April). Vehicular platooning in
an adversarial environment. In Proceedings of the 10th ACM Symposium on Information,
Computer and Communications Security (pp. 167-178). ACM.”
”Dadras, S., Dadras, S., and Winstead, C. (2018, June). Reachable Set Analysis
of Vehicular Platooning in Adversarial Environment. In 2018 Annual American Control
Conference (ACC) (pp. 5568-5575). IEEE.”
”Dadras, S., Dadras, S., and Winstead, C. (2018, June). Identification of the attacker
in cyber-physical systems with an application to vehicular platooning in adversarial envi-
ronment. In 2018 Annual American Control Conference (ACC) (pp. 5560-5567). IEEE.”
”Dadras, S., Dadras, S., and Winstead, C. Resilient Control Design for Vehicular Pla-
tooning in an Adversarial Environment. In 2019 Annual American Control Conference
(ACC) IEEE.”
1.5 Outline of The Dissertation
This dissertation is organized to cover the security of vehicle platooning from attack
and defense perspectives. In the two chapters following the introductory chapter, Chapter 2
and Chapter 3, the attacks on stability and string stability of the platoon are formulated and
the attacker’s capability to drive the platoon to its desired states and create catastrophic
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impacts on other vehicles during the attack under input constraint is studied. In Chapter 4,
an effective algorithm to detect the attacker in the platoon in the adversarial environment
is proposed. In Chapter 5, resilient control is designed to defend the victims in the event
of the attack. Finally, the summary of the results and the possible future direction of the
research are presented in Chapter 6.
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CHAPTER 2
Platoon Stability and String Stability
2.1 Background and Contribution of This Work
The vehicular platooning concept, wherein a group of vehicles act as a single unit
through coordination of movements, dates back to at least the 1970s [80], and rose to
prominence in the U.S. during the 1990s with the California Partners for Advanced Transit
and Highways (PATH) program [127]. It continues to be of interest to academics, gov-
ernments, and industry [6, 74, 98], and has seen several recent demonstrations [17, 128], in
no small part because of its potential benefits, which include increases in safety, roadway
capacity, and efficiency [11,49,61].
While many aspects of platooning are active areas of research, e.g. transportation
impacts, mechanical and control concerns [5,87,89], comparatively little work has examined
platooning in an adversarial environment. In fact, there are only few such works: [70]
examined platooning under the effects of jamming. In this work,it is considered an attacker
seeking to destabilize or take control of a platoon through purely local modifications to
the control system of the vehicle under their control. The analysis shows that the primary
design criterion of platooned systems (stability) can be violated by such means, and that
catastrophic accidents, more severe than simply ignoring the control laws, can be effected.
A critical characteristic of vehicle platoons is that they be string stable. In the case
of a homogeneous platoon of vehicles (i.e. all vehicles have the same performance charac-
teristics), string stability guarantees system stability [18] and, in the absence of particular
inflows/outflows, the prevention of traffic flow instability [47,139]. As it is shown, it is possi-
ble for a malicious actor to induce both instability and string instability and, if perpetrated
on a large enough scale, it can create traffic flow instability.
An important distinction is also made as to the roles of vehicles in a platoon. Generally,
17


























































Figure 5: (a) The falling and (b) rising portions of the first clock period of a keyboard’s clock line. In each
case the time it takes the signal to transition to the new level is greater when a HKL is present (red) than
when it is not (blue). (c) and (d) show the voltage of the clock line with (red) and without a HKL (blue) for
the lower portion of the first two clock periods. In each case the level is less due to the loading e↵ects of the
HKL.
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Fig. 2.1: Position and velocity of a platoon under attack. An attacker in the last position
leverages instability to cause the platoon to crash into the leader at heightened velocities
(time of impact ≈ 27 s).
a platoon will have a leader that is responsible for setting the trajectory and speed of the
vehicles behind it. The following vehicles (followers) share a common control algorithm that
prescribes how they are to react to perturbations in steady-state operation (e.g. the leader
speeding up or slowing down). In this work, the extent to which a malicious actor in control
of the following vehicle could subvert the role of the leader and, even more disconcertingly,
control the movements (state) of other followers, to an arbitrary degree, are examined.
Finally, while the majority of this work focuses on analyzing the attack ag inst a sin-
gle controller (proportional-derivative) employed with the particular platooning algorithm
(bidirectional), the demonstrated attack is general enough to be applicable to a wide va-
riety of controllers/algorithms. To justify this supposition, it is shown how a non-linear
controller, based on sliding mode control, when used with a unidirectional platooning algo-
rithm, can be manipulated to produce similar unstable behavior that can be utilized by an
attacker. What attack conveys is that control system designers must consider the possibility




While system instabilities are generally catastrophic, an attacker could also leverage
instabilities to target vehicles, in a controlled manner, for crashes with effects far greater
than if the instability were not employed. For example, an attacker at the rear of a platoon
who wishes to target the leader could simply ignore the control law governing the platoon
and accelerate, which would indeed cause preceding vehicles to crash into the leader. The
severity of the accident will depend on the relative velocities of the vehicles, with respect to
the leader, at the time of impact. However, to maximize relative velocity, the attacker could
instead introduce instability and then cause the vehicles to oscillate at the resulting resonant
frequency. Each subsequent period of the oscillation will cause the followers to brake more
and accelerate more (increasing/decreasing their maximum/minimum velocity). Before the
vehicles have crashed into the leader, and while they are at their maximum velocity, the
attacker need only stop accelerating to have the other followers maintain their heightened
velocities as they crash into the leader (Figure 2.1). It has been found that the mean relative
velocities when the attacker leverages instability can be 60% greater than when the attacker
simply accelerates, while the kinetic energy at the time of impact can be 160% higher.
2.1.2 Related work
Within the platooning literature, the work that comes closest to examining platooning
in an adversarial environment concerns the stability/string stability of heterogenous pla-
toons [125]. In [56,124], controllers were proposed to maintain the string stability/stability
of heterogeneous platoons; however, these controllers were designed without considering
the actions of malicious actors. In particular, they assume that vehicles will adhere to the
strictures of the control law and that the information provided by vehicles is genuine. Thus,
they are unlikely to be able to maintain the integrity of a platoon in the presence of an
attacker. The aforementioned work also showed that, in the heterogeneous case, stability
does not necessarily imply string stability. Furthermore, it is shown that in the adversarial
case neither is implied by the other; i.e. it is possible to have a platoon that is string stable
but not stable or one that is stable but not string stable.
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Within the broader work on the security of cyber-physical systems (CPS), the authors
of [12] mention that CPSs are uniquely vulnerable to an attack that causes the system
to resonate (become unstable), which is one of the goals of the attacker (the other being
to wrest control of the platoon from the leader). They do not, however, describe an exact
mechanism for carrying out the attack (other than sensor or controller compromise), as such
an attack is specific the particular CPS under consideration. It has been shown how such an
attack could be effected against a platoon by an attacker in control of only a single vehicle.
Barreto et al. [4] analyzed how an attacker could affect a system, in terms of controllability
and stability, when given control over actuators and sensors. This attack differs in that an
attacker alters the state matrix directly and can only know/modify their own control input
(though they needn’t necessarily use it to carry out the attack).
This attack vector bears some resemblance to an insider version of the replay attack
of [114], in that the attacker is part of the CPS and is, therefore, able to inject control inputs
legitimately, though the attacker does not need to gain control of sensors to carry out the
attack. A single autonomous vehicle was destabilized using a variant of the replay attack
that used false-data injection (FDI) in [108]. This attack is effected through malicious
vehicle movement/response and FDI is unnecessary.
Finally, to the best of author’s knowledge, the formalism used to model the attacker
was first proposed in [113] to define misbehaving agents in consensus networks. The attack
is also unidentifiable in the sense of [113].
2.2 Platoon and threat models
The platooning law of the system under investigation, the rationale for selecting it, and
the capabilities and goals of the attacker formally are described.
2.2.1 Platoon model
The analysis focuses on exploiting longitudinal control laws for platooning, which are
intended to maintain the separation/velocity of vehicles in a platoon as they follow a straight
line. While it may be possible to exploit lateral control laws, too, longitudinal control
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Fig. 2.2: (a) An n-vehicle platoon employing a bi-directional control law. Arrows represent
the flow of information. (b) The minimum derivate gains necessary to guarantee string
stability (kp = 1).
represents an inherently coupled system (a CPS), where the movements of one vehicle have
the potential to influence others.1 In addition, vehicles with longitudinal control (in the
form of adaptive cruise control) are available from all major auto manufacturers. Thus, it
is considered a straight, dedicated platooning lane with a platoon traveling at a constant
velocity. All of the vehicles in the platoon are assumed to share the same performance
characteristics (i.e. the platoon is homogenous); nonlinearities in vehicle performance can
be linearized through feedback linearization techniques [81].
Following the reasoning set forth at the end of the Introduction, of the dozen of control
laws available [87, 89], a platooning law that is simple enough for straightforward analysis
and presentation is selected, but also has several characteristics deemed desirable by the
platooning community. Specifically, the bi-directional (predecessor-follower) proportional-
derivative (PD) controller of [142] is used to demonstrate the catastrophic effect a malicious
actor can have on platooning operations. This control law is capable of maintaining a
constant separation, d, between vehicles, based solely on local sensing. This is important
1Even in the case of strictly autonomous vehicles, a control law is needed to maintain separation between
vehicle. Thus, a string of such vehicles, employing the same control law, could become coupled in a platoon-
like manner.
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because it allows us to show that an attacker can affect the platoon solely through malicious
movement and needn’t rely on interfering with communication between vehicles, as in [70].
Formally, the dynamics of a platoon with n vehicles (Figure 5.1) employing this control
law are described by the following system of equations
ẋ1 = v1




px1 − k2px2 + k2pd+ k2px3 − k2px2 − k2pd






p xn−2 − kn−1p xn−1 + kn−1p d+ kn−1p xn − kn−1p xn−1
− kn−1p d+ kn−1d vn−2 − 2k
n−1






pxn−1 − knpxn + knp d+ knd vn−1 − knd vn + u
where xi and vi represent the position and velocity, respectively, of the i
th vehicle (ȧ denotes
the first derivative with respect to time of the variable a) and kip and k
i
d represent their
proportional and derivate gains. For normal platooning operations kip and k
i
d are the same
for each vehicles (Thus, it is dispensed with the superscript unless referring to the gains for
a vehicle in a particular position). kp is traditionally fixed at one, while kd varies according
to the size of the platoon (Figure 2.2b). Here, u represents the control input for the leader
(the nth vehicle). In the steady-state u is generally taken to equal zero; however, it is noted
that knp 6= 0 and knd 6= 0 implies that the followers would be able to influence the leader’s
movements, unless u is set to cancel out the follower movements, which would effectively set
knp = k
n
d = 0. In any case, from the security perspective, it seems inadvisable for followers
to be able to influence the leader. This ambiguity is of consequence for the controllability
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analysis (Section 2.4).






































































Figure 3: The position error between a vehicle and its predecessor due to initial di↵erences in spacing and
velocity for a five vehicle platoon. When the platoon is (a) stable the error reduces to zero, but when (b)
unstable the error growth is unbounded.




where x = [x1, v1, x2, v2, · · · , xn, vn]> 2 R2n are the
states of all the vehicles in the platoon, A 2 R2n⇥2n, B 2




]|. C is the identity
matrix (because we assume that all the vehicle states are
measurable), B has non-zero entries corresponding to the




= a sin!t, re-
spectively, where a is the amplitude of the attacker’s input
and ! is the frequency at which the input oscillates.
The goals and methods of the attacker may be stated for-
mally as: 1) to introduce instability/string instability by
modifying the entries in A controlled by the attacker so as
to produce an instability and then realize a u
a
= a sin!t to
e↵ect the instability, and 2) to control the platoon by select-
ing the entires in A and B under their influence to make the
system controllable and then derive a controller for u
a
that
allows them to move the system to a desired state.
3. PLATOON STABILITY
The stability of an LTI system (2) is given by [6]:
Definition 1 (Marginal and Asymptotic Stability).
The homogeneous LTI system ẋ = Ax is said to be marginally
asymptotically stable if, for every initial condition x(t0) =
x0, the homogeneous state-space response x(t) =  (t, t0)x0,
8t   0, where  (t, t0) is the state transition matrix, is uni-
formly bounded. The system is asymptotically stable if x(t) )
0 as t ) 1.
The homogeneous LTI system is both marginally and asymp-
totically stable if all the eigenvalues of A have negative real
part [6].
Definition 2 (BIBO Stability). The homogeneous LTI
system (2) is said to be bounded input bounded output (BIBO)
stable if every bounded input u has a bounded forced response
y.
If a system is asymptotically stable (i.e., if all the eigenvalues
of A have a negative real part) then the system is (BIBO)
stable [6]. Figure 3 shows the response of a five vehicle
platoon to initial errors in spacing and velocity when the
platoon is asymptotically stable (Figure 3a) and unstable
(Figure 3b).
In what follows, we prove that by modifying the derivative
gain of a single vehicle under their control and applying an
sinusoidal acceleration, an attacker can produce both insta-
bility and string instability in a platoon. The range of gains
and the frequencies corresponding to the resultant unstable
modes are discussed.
As per [32], we assume that non-attacker (victim) vehicles




, chosen based on
platoon size, to ensure stability. We denote the attacker
derivate gain as k̃
d
; the attacker uses the same proportional
gain as the rest of the vehicles in the platoon.
3.1 String instability
The stability/string stability condition in the homoge-
neous case states that spacing errors between vehicles should






to represent the spacing error between the ith and ith+1









     < 1 for i = 1, . . . , n  2 (3)
where s = |! and ! is the angular frequency. |G
i
(s)| repre-
sents the magnitude of the (error) transfer function between
the ith and ith+1 vehicles. The transfer function varies ac-
cording to the relative position of the vehicles and their
gains; thus the e↵ects of an attacker changing their gain,
in an attempt to violate (3), will depend upon the relative
position of the attacker. To understand the attacker’s im-
pact requires that we derive the form of the transfer function
for an attacker at each possible position. We perform the
requisite derivation for an attacker at the first position here
and then simply provide the expressions for the remainder
of the positions.
3.1.1 Transfer function derivation
To aid in this task, we first transform the system dynamics
given in (1) to error coordinates
z1 = x1   x2
y1 = ż1 = v1   v2
z2 = x2   x3




Fig. 2.3: The position error between a vehicle and its predecessor due to initial differences
in spacing and velocity for a five vehicle platoon. When the platoon is (a) stable the error
reduces to zero, but when (b) unstable the error growth is unbounded.
2.2.2 Threat models
I is examined the case of a single actor in control of a vehicle within an already
established platoon, traveling at a constant speed, who attempts to destabilize (Section 2.3)
or take control (Section 2.4) of the platoon. In the context of the present work, the attacker
ay accomplish this by causing the vehicle under their control to subvert or ignore the
control law established for maintaining follower separation. This implies that the controller
gains of the attacker’s vehicle could be modified and should movement in one direction be
prescribed by the control law, the vehicle is free to ignore it. The attacker’s vehicle is taken
to have exactly the same capabilities as the other vehicles in the platoon.
Because it is desired to demo strate t at an attacker is capable of disrupting/controlling
platooning operations without b ing assigned nominal control of the platoon, it is assumed
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that the attacker does not act as the leader of the platoon. It is noted, however, that be-
cause of the symmetry of the control law (Equation 5.1), any influence that the first vehicle
in the platoon is able to effect could be carried out by the leader.
The equivalent state-space representation of the linear time-invariant (LTI) system
defined by (5.1) in the presence of an attacker is
ẋ = Ax +Bu
y = Cx
(2.2)
where x = [x1, v1, x2, v2, · · · , xn, vn]> ∈ R2n are the states of all the vehicles in the
platoon, A ∈ R2n×2n, B ∈ R2n×2, C ∈ R2n×2n, and u = [ul ua]ᵀ. C is the identity matrix
(because it is assumed that all the vehicle states are measurable), B has non-zero entries
corresponding to the leader and the attacker control, ul and ua = a sinωt, respectively,
where a is the amplitude of the attacker’s input and ω is the frequency at which the input
oscillates.
The goals and methods of the attacker may be stated formally as: 1) to introduce
instability/string instability by modifying the entries in A controlled by the attacker so as
to produce instability and then realize a ua = a sinωt to affect the instability, and 2) to
control the platoon by selecting the entries in A and B under their influence to make the
system controllable and then derive a controller for ua that allows them to move the system
to the desired state.
2.3 Platoon stability
The stability of an LTI system (5.2) is given by [13]:
Definition 2.3.1 (Marginal and Asymptotic Stability) The homogeneous LTI system
ẋ = Ax is said to be marginally asymptotically stable if, for every initial condition x(t0) =
x0, the homogeneous state-space response x(t) = Φ(t, t0)x0, ∀t ≥ 0, where Φ(t, t0) is
the state transition matrix, is uniformly bounded. The system is asymptotically stable if
x(t)⇒ 0 as t⇒∞.
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The homogeneous LTI system is both marginally and asymptotically stable if all the eigen-
values of A have negative real part [13].
Definition 2.3.2 (BIBO Stability) The homogeneous LTI system (5.2) is said to be
bounded input bounded output (BIBO) stable if every bounded input u has a bounded forced
response y.
If a system is asymptotically stable (i.e., if all the eigenvalues of A have a negative real
part) then the system is (BIBO) stable [13]. Figure 2.3 shows the response of a five vehicle
platoon to initial errors in spacing and velocity when the platoon is asymptotically stable
(Figure 2.3a) and unstable (Figure 2.3b).
In what follows, it is proved that by modifying the derivative gain of a single vehicle
under their control and applying a sinusoidal acceleration, an attacker can produce both
instability and string instability in a platoon. The range of gains and the frequencies
corresponding to the resultant unstable modes are discussed.
As per [142], it is assumed that non-attacker (victim) vehicles select the same set of
gains, kp and kd, chosen based on platoon size, to ensure stability. It is denoted the attacker
derivative gain as k̃d; the attacker uses the same proportional gain as the rest of the vehicles
in the platoon.
2.3.1 String instability
The stability/string stability condition in the homogeneous case states that spacing
errors between vehicles should attenuate as they move upstream. Allowing zi = xi−xi+1 to
represent the spacing error between the ith and ith+1 vehicles, the string stability criterion
may be stated as [142]
|Gi(s)| =
∣∣∣∣ zizi+1
∣∣∣∣ < 1 for i = 1, . . . , n− 2 (2.3)
where s = ω and ω is the angular frequency. |Gi(s)| represents the magnitude of the
(error) transfer function between the ith and ith+1 vehicles. The transfer function varies
according to the relative position of the vehicles and their gains; thus the effects of an
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attacker changing their gain, in an attempt to violate (2.3), will depend upon the relative
position of the attacker. To understand the attacker’s impact requires that it is derived
the form of the transfer function for an attacker at each possible position. The requisite
derivation for an attacker at the first position is performed here and then simply provide
the expressions for the remainder of the positions.
Transfer function derivation
To aid in this task, first the system dynamics given in (5.1) is transformed to error
coordinates
z1 = x1 − x2
y1 = ż1 = v1 − v2
z2 = x2 − x3
y2 = ż2 = v2 − v3
...
(2.4)
zn−2 = xn−2 − xn−1
yn−2 = żn−2 = vn−2 − vn−1
zn−1 = xn−1 − xn
yn−1 = żn−1 = vn−1 − vn
The resulting equations in error coordinates for an attacker at the first position are then
ż1 = y1
ẏ1 = −2kpz1 + kpz2 − (kd + k̃d)y1 + kdy2
26
ż2 = y2
ẏ2 = kpz1 − 2kpz2 + kpz3 + kdy1 − 2kdy2 + kdy3
...
żn−2 = yn−2
ẏn−2 = kpzn−3 − 2kpzn−2 + kpzn−1
+ kdyn−3 − 2kdyn−2 + kdyn−1
żn−1 = yn−1
ẏn−1 = kpzn−2 − 2kpzn−1 + kdyn−2 − 2kdyn−1 + u
(2.5)
To find |G1(s)| =
∣∣∣ z1z2 ∣∣∣ is transformed that
ẏ1 = z2 − 2z1 + kdy2 − (k̃d + kd)y1
⇒ z̈1 = z2 − 2zn−1 + kdż2 − (k̃d + kd)ż1
⇒ s2z1 + s(k̃d + kd)z1 + 2z1 = z2 + kdsz2




∣∣∣∣ = ∣∣∣∣ 1 + kdss2 + s(k̃d + kd) + 2
∣∣∣∣ (2.6)
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Similarly, for |G2(s)| =
∣∣∣ z2z3 ∣∣∣
ẏ2 = z3 − 2z2 + z1 + kdy3 − 2kdy2 + kdy1
⇒ z̈2 = z3 − 2z2 + z1 + kdż3 − 2kdż2 + kdż1
⇒ s2z2 + 2kdsz2 + 2z2 = z3 + kdsz3 + z1 + kdsz1
⇒ (s2 + 2kds+ 2)z2 = (1 + kds)z3 + (1 + kds)z1
⇒ (s2 + 2kds+ 2)z2 = (1 + kds)z3
+ (1 + kds)
1 + kds
s2 + s(k̃d + kd) + 2
z2
⇒ (s2 + 2kds+ 2− (1 + kds)
1 + kds
s2 + s(k̃d + kd) + 2
)z2












to simplify the transfer functions it is defined
g1 =
1 + k̃ds
s2 + s(k̃d + kd) + 2
g2 =
1 + kds
s2 + s(k̃d + kd) + 2
g3 =
1 + kds
s2 + 2kds+ 2
|G3(s)| to |Gn−2(s)| follow a similar pattern as |G2(s)|; thus, the transfer functions for the
platoon when an attacker is in the first position may be stated as
|G1(s)| = |g2| , |G2(s)| =
∣∣∣∣ g31−G1g3
∣∣∣∣ , · · · ,
|Gi(s)| =
∣∣∣∣ g31−Gi−1g3
∣∣∣∣ , · · · , |Gn−2(s)| = ∣∣∣∣ g31−Gn−3g3
∣∣∣∣ (2.8)




To violate the string stability condition an attacker must select a gain, k̃d, such that
the inequality of (2.3) is reversed. Even though the attacker gain may appear in more than
one transfer function, the attacker need only cause a single |Gi(s)| =
∣∣∣ zizi+1 ∣∣∣ > 1 to breach
the stability criterion. In what follows is the demonstration of how an attacker in the first
position should select their gain to achieve this; Then an algorithm that generalizes the
procedure for the remaining positions is offered.
Beginning from the analysis given above, it has been shown
|G1(s)| =
√
<(G1)2 + =(G1)2 (2.9)
where <(·) and =(·) denote the real and imaginary parts, respectively, of G1(s). Considering
each separately, it has been shown
< = (−1 + kdk̃d + (kd)
2)w2 + 2
w4 + w2((kd)2 + (k̃d)2 + 2kdk̃d − 4) + 4
= = (−kdw
3 + w(kd − k̃d))
w4 + w2((kd)2 + (k̃d)2 + 2kdk̃d − 4) + 4
(2.10)
The attacker wishes to satisfy
√
<(G1)2 + =(G1)2 > 1. Using (2.10) this condition is
transformed as
α(k̃d)
2 + β(k̃d) + γ > 0 (2.11)
where α = 1, β = 2kd and γ =
w4 − 4w2 + 3
w2
. To make (2.11) greater than zero for some
value of k̃d requires that ∆ = β
2 − 4αγ > 0, which results in
(kd)
2 >
w4 − 4w2 + 3
w2
(2.12)
Thus, to make the system string unstable an attacker should choose a k̃d that lies between










. It is noted




the system is string stable and cannot be
made string unstable. However, a kd smaller than the minimum values given in Figure 2.2b
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would compromise string stability for other vehicles, and furthermore, as it has been shown
in Section 2.3.2, small values of kd make it easier for an attacker to destabilize the platoon.
Beyond an attacker in the first position, symbolic analysis becomes tedious. Therefore,
an algorithm for numerically determining k̃d for a platoon of size n that uses a derivate gain
of kd, at a given ω (Algorithm 1) is proposed. The general procedure for an attacker at
the ith position is to evaluate the real and imaginary parts of the first transfer function, Gi,
where k̃d appears and arrange the results into the form of (2.11). Table 2.1 provides the
range of gains, as a function of attacker position, that make a ten vehicle platoon unstable
for ω = {π/4, π/2, π, 2π} . It is noted that, in general, the lower the frequency of string
instability, the higher the attacker gain can be to effect it.
Algorithm 1: Finding the attacker gain to make the platoon string unstable.
Input : kd, n and ω (a normal vehicle gain, platoon size, and frequency)
Output: k̃d (gain for the attacker which makes the platoon string unstable)
i ← first transfer function affected by attacker;
α(k̃d)
2 + β(k̃d) + γ > 0 ← =(Gi)2 + <(Gi)2 > 1;
∆ ← β2 − 4αγ;
if α > 0 and ∆ > 0 then






else if α < 0 and ∆ > 0 then






else if α < 0 and ∆ < 0 then
an attacker can not make the platoon string unstable;






platoon is always string unstable;
end
2.3.2 Instability
An attacker can make the platoon asymptotically and BIBO unstable only by changing
the eigenvalues of A (by making real part of at least one eigenvalue positive). First, it has
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Table 2.1: Attacker gains to guarantee string instability for a ten vehicle platoon, with
respect to attacker position and frequency. k̃d must be within the given intervals; kd = 7.7.
ω
position
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2π > −12.59, < −2.81 < −6.16 < −8.41 < −10.24 < −10.22 < −10.06 < −10.03 < −10.04 < −10.04
π > −15.03, < −0.37 < −4.25 < −3.45 < −4.42 < −5.15 < −5.28 < −5.21 < −5.15 < −5.13
π/2 > −15.58, < 0.18 < −3.83 < −2.02 < −1.75 < −1.98 < −2.30 < −2.5 < −2.55 < −2.54
π/4 > −15.92, < 0.52 < −3.95 < −1.83 < −1.04 < −0.62 < −0.42 < −0.38 < −0.44 < −0.52
been proved that an attacker can introduce an instability into a platoon, and then show that
this instability can be effected through malicious movements on the part of the attacker.
Attacker gain derivation
To prove that an attacker can cause a platoon to become unstable by changing its
derivative gain (i.e. k̃d 6= kd), the error coordinates formulation given by (2.4) is used. For
an n vehicle platoon, the state matrix, A ∈ R2(n−1)×2(n−1), for the error coordinates will,
however, depend on the position of the attacker.
The general form of A, in the absence of an attacker, is given by
A =
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
−2kp −2kd kp kd 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 · · · 0
kp kd −2kp −2kd kp kd 0 · · · 0
. . .
0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 · · · 0 0 0 kp kd −2kp −2kd

(2.13)
Allow A(i, j) to represent access to the element at the ith row and jth column of A. When
an attacker is present at the first position, only A(2, 2) = −kd − k̃d of (5.3) needs to be
changed. An attacker in the ith position, 1 < i < n− 1, will change the following elements
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of (5.3)
A(2(i− 1), 2(i− 1)) = −kd − k̃d, A(2(i− 1), 2i) = k̃d
A(2i, 2(i− 1)) = k̃d, A(2i, 2i) = −kd − k̃d
(2.14)
When the attacker position is i = n − 1, only A(2(i − 1), 2(i − 1)) = −kd − k̃d of (5.3) is
changed.
lemma 1 A platoon cannot be stable if the real part of a single eigenvalue of A is greater
than zero. An attacker who selects a derivative gain k̃d < −kd will cause A to have at least
one eigenvalue with a positive, real part and therefore make the platoon unstable.
proof 1 The non-symmetric matrix A will necessarily have an eigenvalue with a positive,
real component if an x ∈ R2(n−1) can be found such that xᵀAx > 0. The gains in the absence
of an attacker are selected to ensure that the state matrix of (5.3) will produce xᵀAx < 0 for
every x and that the eigenvalues of (5.3) will have only negative, real components. Thus,
for an attacker to create instability, the vector x must contain at least one element such
that the product xᵀAx includes k̃d.
For an attacker in the first position x = [0 1 0 · · · 0]ᵀ with A(2, 2) = −kd − k̃d are
selected
xᵀAx = A(2, 2) = −kd − k̃d > 0⇒ k̃d < −kd (2.15)
Similarly, for an attacker in the ith position, 1 < i < n, x(2(i− 1)) = 1 with the remaining
elements of x set to zero are selected and the modifications to A given by (2.14) (it is noted
that that for i = n− 1 only A(2(i− 1), 2(i− 1)) is changed)
xᵀAx = A(2(i− 1), 2(i− 1)) = −kd − k̃d > 0⇒ k̃d < −kd (2.16)
∴ ∀k̃d < −kd will make a platoon unstable, independent of the position of the attacker.
It is noted that the above analysis does not necessarily determine the maximum attacker
gain that will result in instability. In fact, it gives a necessary rather than sufficient value
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for the attacker gain; i.e. k̃d > −kd may still produce instability. To find the maximum
attacker gain, the gain margin of the characteristic equation for platoons of size n = [3, 10],
is calculated using attacker positions of i = 1, · · · , n − 1. Figure 2.4a gives the maximum
attacker gains to produce instability, as a function of platoon size and attacker position.






























Fig. 2.4: (a) Maximum attacker gains that produce instability, as function of attacker
position and platoon size, n. (b) The frequencies of instability corresponding to maximum
attacker gains.
Frequency response of the platoon
It has been demonstrated that it is possible for an attacker, through judicious selection
of their derivative gain, to cause a platoon to violate the stability criterion. It is not,
however, sufficient for the system to contain a potential unstable mode: the attacker must
be able to affect the instability through the movement of their vehicle (i.e. accelerate/brake
in an oscillatory fashion). This requires that an attacker, in reference to (5.2), either realize
a control input at the frequency of the instability ω or introduce a position/velocity error.
In either case, the vehicles in the platoon must be capable of oscillating at ω. For the
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attack to be feasible, it has been stipulated that the frequency of the instability be less than
or equal to one hertz (ω ≤ 2π); also, this condition for string instability (Table 2.1) has
been applied. Figure 2.4b gives the unstable frequency for the maximum attacker gain that
causes instability, with respect to attacker position and platoon size, found in Section 2.3.2;
at every position the attack is feasible. Figure 2.5 further demonstrates that an attacker
can meet the feasibility constraint for a wide range gains, at every position in ten vehicle
platoon (when an attacker gain resulted in multiple instabilities, the one with the highest
frequency) is selected.
The exact response of the system to the instability introduced by the attacker may be
calculated as follows. The solution of the LTI state-space system (5.2) with u = a sinωt can
be written as x(t) = xh(t) + xf (t), where xh(t) = e
Atx0 is the zero-input or homogeneous
solution and xf (t) = aα sin(ωt + φ) is the zero-state or forced response [13]. In the forced
response α is the magnitude of the transfer function ĝ(s) = C(sI − A)−1B, computed at
s = jω, and φ is the phase angle of the transfer function, computed at s = jω. Refer-
ring to the stability conditions discussed earlier, it can be said that if all the eigenvalues
of A have negative real parts, the homogeneous part xh(t) → 0 and x(t) is then equal to
the forced response xf (t). In other words, the LTI system response oscillates with the at-
tacker’s frequency ω. The oscillations, in this case, are bounded, not fulfilling the attacker’s
objectives.
In order to create growing (unbounded) oscillations, the attacker has to change the
eigenvalues of A (i.e. make the real part of at least one eigenvalue positive) by changing
k̃d, as shown in the previous section. Changing k̃d can result in two types of behavior,
depending on the kd used by the platoon.
1) If the attacker selects k̃d < −kd and kd is near the minimum value given in Figure
2.2b then in addition to making the real parts of up to two eigenvalues positive, imaginary
parts to some of the remaining eigenvalues of A may also be introduced. This will result
in oscillating xh(t) with growing amplitude (caused by the negative damping introduced by
the attacker) and with frequency ωd = ωn
√
1− ζ2 with growing amplitude, where ωn is the
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natural frequency of the platoon, and ζ is the damping coefficient. The natural frequency ωn
is the magnitude of the poles with an imaginary part. This implies that the time response
of the platoon states, x(t) = xh(t) + xf (t), is the sum of two signals oscillating at two
different frequencies ωd and ω and that the amplitude of the oscillations grows with time.
2) If the attacker selects k̃d < −kd and kd is much greater than the minimum value
given in Figure 2.2b then, unlike the above scenario, the attacker is only able to make
the real parts of up to two eigenvalues positive, but not introduce imaginary parts to any
eigenvalues of A. This will result in exponentially growing xh(t) (caused by the negative
damping introduced by the attacker) without any oscillations. This implies that the time
response of platoon states, x(t) = xh(t) + xf (t), grows with time and oscillates at the
attacker’s frequency ω.
2.3.3 Comparing string stability and stability
In the case of a homogeneous platoon, string stability (SS) will ensure stability (S);
however, in the adversarial case, neither implies the other. To prove that SS 6⇒ S and
S 6⇒ SS, it is sufficient to find one example in which the system is stable but not string
stable and another example in which it is string stable but not stable. For the former case,
n = 20, kd = 14 are selected, and an attacker at position one with k̃d = −0.2, which results
in stability/string instability at ω = 2.1, while for the latter n = 3, kd = 2.5 are used, and
an attacker at position one with k̃d = −5 to produce instability/string stability at ω = 0.474
(Figure 2.6 depicts the string stable/string unstable regions vs. k̃d for these cases).
2.4 Platoon controllability
In this section, the controllability of the platoon from an attacker’s perspective; i.e.
whether an attacker can cause other vehicles in the platoon to take on arbitrary states and
by doing so fully control their movements (separation between neighboring vehicles and
velocity) has been investigated.
Definition 2.4.1 (Controllability) A system is said to be controllable if and only if it is
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Table 1: Attacker gains to guarantee string instability for a ten vehicle platoon, with respect to attacker
position and frequency. k̃
d
must be within the given intervals.
!
position
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
2⇡ >  12.59, <  2.81 <  6.16 <  8.41 <  10.24 <  10.22 <  10.06 <  10.03 <  10.04 <  10.04
⇡ >  15.03, <  0.37 <  4.25 <  3.45 <  4.42 <  5.15 <  5.28 <  5.21 <  5.15 <  5.13
⇡/2 >  15.58, < 0.18 <  3.83 <  2.02 <  1.75 <  1.98 <  2.30 <  2.5 <  2.55 <  2.54
pi/4 >  15.92, < 0.52 <  3.95 <  1.83 <  1.04 <  0.62 <  0.42 <  0.38 <  0.44 <  0.52






























Figure 2: (a) Maximum attacker gains that produce instability, as function of attacker position and platoon



















Figure 3: Frequencies at which a ten vehicle pla-
toon can be made unstable, with respect to attacker
position and gain.
calculating its eigenvalues. The absolute value of the eigen-
values with positive, real components provide the unstable
frequencies. Figure 3 demonstrates that an attacker can
meet our feasibility constraint for a wide range gains, at ev-
ery position in ten vehicle platoon (when an attacker gain
resulted in multiple instabilities, we selected the one with
the highest frequency).
3.3 Comparing String Stability and Stability
In the case of a homogeneous platoon, string stability (SS)
will ensure stability (S); however, in the adversarial case
neither implies the other. To prove that SS 6) S and S 6)
SS, it is su cient to find one example in which the system
is stable but not string stable and another example in which
it is string stable but not stable. For the former case, we
select n = 20, k
d
= 14, and an attacker at position one with
· · · · · ·
k̃
d
-25.0 -20.0 -15.0 -10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0 1 1
str. stable(-5,unstable)
(2)




Figure 4: Attacker at position one. (1) system stable




=  0.2, which results in stability/string instability at
! = 2.1 rad s 1, while for the latter we use n = 3, k
d
= 2.5,
and an attacker at position one with k̃
d
=  5 to produce
instability/string stability at ! = 0.474 rad s 1 (Figure 4





In this section we investigate the controllability of the pla-
toon from attacker’s perspective; i.e. whether an attacker
can cause other vehicles in the platoon to take on arbitrary
states and by doing so fully control their movements (sepa-
ration between neighboring vehicles and velocity).
A system is said to be controllable if and only if it is
possible, by means of the input, to transfer the system from
one state to another state in finite time. A LTI system
represented by
ẋ = Ax+Bu (18)
where x 2 Rn, A 2 Rn⇥n, u 2 Rm, and B 2 Rn⇥m. is





B · · · An 1B
⇤
(19)
is full rank (i.e rank(C) = n) [5].
6
Fig. 2.5: Frequencies at which a ten vehicle platoon can be mad unstable, with respect to
attacker position and gain.
possible, by means of the input, to transfer the system from one state to another state in
finite time.
A LTI system represented by
ẋ = Ax+Bu (2.17)




B AB A2B · · · An−1B
]
(2.18)
is full rank (i.e rank(C) = n) [13].
In what follows, a controllability analysis to determine an attacker’s ability to control
the states (position and velocity) of other vehicles in the platoon is performed. A general
controllability framework for dynamic systems was investigated from a security perspective
in [4]. The author is specifically interested in whether an attacker can control the states
of all the other vehicles or only some vehicle states in a platoon. To comment on the
controllability of the vehicle platoon with an attacker planning malicious control, a five
vehicle platoon using error coordinates is considered. Due to the regularity of the state
matrix, only three attacker positions need to be examined. Because of the ambiguity in
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how the control law is to be applied (end of Section 2.2.1), controllability for two different
leader behaviors is investigated: 1) the leader is not affected by followers and 2) the leader
responds to the perturbations of followers as any other vehicle in the platoon would.
2.4.1 Lead vehicle unaffected by followers
In this scenario, the lead vehicle is not applying the vehicle platooning control law and
moves at a constant speed (knp = k
n
d = 0, ul = 0). Equations of motion for the lead vehicle
(5th vehicle) can be written as
ẋ5 = v5
v̇5 = 0.
Relative equations of motion for controllability analysis are used. Under this scenario, con-
trollability of three cases for the attacker at first, second, and third position are investigated.
Attacker at 1st position. A and B matrices for the LTI system in (2.17) for a five
vehicle platoon with attacker in the first position can be written as
A =

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
−2kp −2kd kp kd 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
kp kd −2kp −2kd kp kd 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 kp kd −2kp −2kd kp kd
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1








· · · · · ·
k̃d
-25.0 -20.0 -15.0 -10.0 -5.0 0.0 5.0 10.0 15.0 20.0 25.0−∞ ∞
str. stable(-5,unstable)
(2)




Fig. 2.6: Attacker at position one. (1) system stable but not string stable. (2) system string
stable but not stable.
The controllability matrix C for the above system can be computed using (2.18). It
can be verified that
det(C) = k12p 6= 0
Therefore, it can be said that rank(C) = 8 meaning that system is controllable and the
attacker can control relative position and velocity between all the vehicles.
Attacker at 2nd position. A and B matrices for the LTI system in (2.17) for a five
vehicle platoon with attacker in the second position can be written as
A =

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
−2kp −2kd kp kd 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
kp kd −2kp −2kd kp kd 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 kp kd −2kp −2kd kp kd
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1








The controllability matrix C for the above system can be computed using (2.18). It can be
verified that
det(C) = 0
It can be verified that rank(C) = 6 < 8 meaning that system is not fully controllable when
the attacker is at second position.
To find out uncontrollable states similarity transformation is performed to bring the
controllability matrix into Row Reduced Echelon Form (RREF) which is given by
RREF (C) =

1 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
0 0 1 0 0 0 a1 a2
0 0 0 1 0 0 a3 a4
0 0 0 0 1 0 a5 a6
0 0 0 0 0 1 a7 a8

(2.19)
where a1 = −3k2p, a2 = 12kdk2p, a3 = −6kdkp, a4 = 24k2dkp − 3k2p, a5 = −3k2d − 4kp,
a6 = 12k
3






z2 + a1z4 + a2y4
y2 + a3z4 + a4y4
z3 + a5z4 + a6y4
y3 + a7z4 + a8y4

where z1 = x1 − x2, y1 = v1 − v2, z2 = x2 − x3, y2 = v2 − v3, z3 = x3 − x4, y3 = v3 − v4,
z4 = x4 − x5, and y4 = v4 − v5 are relative position and velocity coordinates.
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Attacker at 3rd position. A and B matrices for the LTI system in (2.17) for a five
vehicle platoon with attacker in the third position can be written as
A =

0 1 0 0 0 0 0 0
−2kp −2kd kp kd 0 0 0 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 0
kp kd −2kp −2kd kp kd 0 0
0 0 0 0 0 1 0 0
0 0 kp kd −2kp −2kd kp kd
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 1




0 0 0 −1 0 1 0 0
]>
.
The controllability matrix C for the above system can be computed using (2.18). It
can be verified that
det(C) = k12p 6= 0
Therefore, it can be said that rank(C) = 8 meaning that system is controllable and the
attacker at the third position can control relative position and velocity between all the
vehicles.
2.4.2 Lead vehicle affected by followers
In this scenario the lead vehicle is also applying the vehicle platooning control law
meaning the attacker can also affect the leader’s motion in this case (knp = kp, k
n
d = kd, ul =
0). Equations of motion for the lead vehicle (5th vehicle) can be written as
ẋ5 = v5
v̇5 = kp(x4 − x5) + kd(v4 − v5).
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Under this scenario, the controllability for the three cases of an attacker at first, second, and
third position are investigated, as above. Table 2.2 summarizes the controllability analysis
results for the two types of leader behavior. Note: an attacker in the third position for
the second case is able to control four states, which are a combination of several individual
vehicle states, as in the case of an attacker in the second position in the first case.
Based on the analysis it can be concluded that the symmetry of an attacker’s position
makes the system uncontrollable, from the attacker’s perspective. For an attacker to com-
pletely control the platoon, the attacker must be situated at certain positions, which are
determined by how the leader implements the platooning control law; partial control (which
may or may not allow an attacker to control other vehicle states individually) is possible
from every position in the platoon.
Having determined which states an attacker can control, the next step is to create a
controller for ua that allows an attacker to control its own motion in such a way as to
regulate distance and velocity between two adjacent vehicles. It is considered the feasibility
of designing such controllers in Section 2.5.2. This type of attack is distinct from, and
more powerful than, an attack in which the attacker’s gains are changed to destabilize the
platoon, as it provides more flexibility (individual states, or a subset of vehicle states, may
be controlled, to a perhaps arbitrary) and safety to the attacker (the attacker needn’t be
affected by the attack).
2.5 Discussion
The security/safety implications of the findings presented in Sections 2.3 and 2.4 are
discussed.
2.5.1 Stability
An attacker able to violate string stability on a large enough scale (i.e. an attacker
in control of several compromised vehicles) and in the right conditions (i.e. high traffic
densities) could affect traffic flow instability; e.g. the creation of phantom traffic jams.
Within a single platoon, violations of string stability would lead to greater than anticipated
41
Table 2.2: Five vehicle controllability results
Case Position#1 Position#2 Position#3
1 (v̇5 = 0) Cont Uncont Cont
2 (v̇5 6= 0) Cont Cont Uncont


























































Figure 5: (a) The falling and (b) rising portions of the first clock period of a keyboard’s clock line. In each
case the time it takes the signal to transition to the new level is greater when a HKL is present (red) than
when it is not (blue). (c) and (d) show the voltage of the clock line with (red) and without a HKL (blue) for
the lower portion of the first two clock periods. In each case the level is less due to the loading e↵ects of the
HKL.
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Fig. 2.7: Position and velocity of a platoon under attack. (a)/(b) Two attackers cause the
platoon to collapse in on itself by oscillating at the resonant frequency, but 180◦ out of
phase.
vehicle separations, which would possibly negate the fuel savings of the platoon, or allow
an attacker to carry out the attack of more effectively.
The example given in Section 2.1.1 illustrates how a singl attacker can leverage in-
stabi ity to target the leader of a platoon. By changing the threat model slightly, in order
accommod te an attacker in control of two vehicles or two colluding attackers, also it can
be illustrated how a single, non-leader vehicle can be targeted. In this case the two attack-
ers are positioned at the first and ninth position of a ten vehicle platoon. They begin to
accelerate and brake contrariwise (one breaks while the other accelerates) at an unstable
frequency. Vehicles following the fifth vehicle will brake at the same time vehicles preceding
the fifth accelerate (and vice versa); the fifth vehicle will not be disturbed. Eventually
the oscillation produced grows so great that the vehicles collide at the center point of the
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platoon; i.e. the platoon collapses in on the fifth vehicle (Figure 2.7). By employing differ-
ent amplitudes for their respective oscillations, the attackers could target vehicles at other
positions for the same attack.
It is noted that countering such attacker-induced instabilities is not a simple matter
of damping out the normal modes of the system. Figure 2.8 shows the position/velocity
gain for the ninth vehicle in a platoon due to a perturbation from an attacker situated
at the first position of the platoon. The wide bandwidth of the gain shows that even if
the attacker doesn’t oscillate at the natural frequency of the system, they can still cause
significant deviations in velocity/position for the victim (essentially each subsequent period
of oscillation by the attacker will cause position/velocity deviations at least twice as great
as the last for the victim). Additionally, while constraining allowable vehicle behavior (e.g.
maximum velocity) decreases the effect of the attack, limits per se cannot prevent it from
being deployed to increase the severity of accidents. For example, if the vehicles in the
above two-attacker example are limited to a maximum velocity of 35 and accelerations in
the range of ±5, a collision resulting from an instability would still see relative velocities
35% greater, and kinetic energy 81% greater, at time of impact than if the attackers had
simply decelerated/accelerated at ±5.
Generality of attack
To demonstrate the widespread applicability of the attack, a platoon is considered
following a unidirectional algorithm [142] employing a second order sliding mode controller
[62]. The control objective in this instance is to make the velocities of the following vehicles
converge to that of the leader’s; only information about the preceding vehicle is used. Again,
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the lower portion of the first two clock periods. In each case the level is less due to the loading e↵ects of the
HKL.
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Fig. 2.8: Po ition/velocity gains f th ni th vehicle in en v hicle platoon for attacker n
the first position. The attacker can cause significant changes to the vehicle even when not
oscillati g at the r sonant frequ ncy.
where xi, vi, and ai denote the position, velocity, and cc leration f the vehicle, WM is
a gain taken to be greater than four times the maximum vehicl accelerati n, amax, and
smax,i is the extremal value of the signal of si = xi − xi+1 + sd0 + hvi, with sd0 being a
desired minimum vehicle spacing at rest and h a “headway time”.
As in the case of PD control, the attacker must first be able to make the system unstable
through a change of gain(s). The resulting resonant frequency must then be achievable by
the th r vehicles in order to affect the attack. First, it has been proved that an attacker
can m ke the platoon unstable, and then has been shown that the resulting frequencies for
some gain changes satisfy the feasibility condition (ω ≤ 2π).
lemma 2 The states of the system will not converge to the desired value of si = 0 (i.e. an
attacker can make the system unstable) if the attacker selects for its gain, WM , in (0, 4amax).
proof 2 In [62], convergence is proved via the contraction property. Should an attacker
choose their gain such that it violates the contraction property, the state trajectory will not
converge to the origin of the state plane. The contraction property holds for the system if
2amax
WM−2amax < 1. If WM is chosen from (0, 4amax) the strict inequality is violated. This holds
for all initial conditions.
By varying the attacker’s gain and simulating the system response (WM = 5amax
was used for victim vehicles), it has been found that the platoon will resonate at feasible
frequencies for attacker gains over the range (0, 1.2amax) (Figure 2.9). The location of
the attacker in the platoon does not affect the resonant frequency, but, because of the
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unidirectional nature of the platooning algorithm, the attacker is only able to force following
vehicles to oscillate. All vehicles oscillate at the same frequency.
2.5.2 Controllability
As it has been shown in Section 2.4, it is theoretically possible for an attacker to control
the states of individual vehicles in the platoon, assuming they are at the proper position.
However, controlling states of other vehicles just by controlling an attacker’s motion falls
under single input multiple output (SIMO) control, which has not been addressed in the
controls literature very extensively. The SIMO control problem has been solved for slow
dynamic systems, such as control of a dam river system, where the action variable is the
upstream discharge and the controlled variable the downstream discharge [95, 96]. In
an extension of this work, the solution to the SIMO control problem in order to design a
controller that allows an attacker to control their motion to regulate other vehicles’ position
and velocity will be proposed. The results of the controllability analysis presented above
should thus been seen as the uncovering of a new vulnerability in vehicle platooning. For
an attacker to exploit this vulnerability will require advances in the area of SIMO control.
Another problem in designing SIMO attacker control is the conditionality of the control
matrix. Even when the system is fully controllable (full rank), the controllability matrix is
badly conditioned (very high condition number). This means even though the attacker can
theoretically control all the other vehicle states, to practically design a controller it may be
required to change the structure of the A and B matrices to improve the condition number
of the controllability matrix. In future work, the use of false data injection to accomplish
this will be explored.
While it is not possible to offer a general-purpose controller that would allow an attacker
to control arbitrary vehicle states, a controller that gives an attacker arbitrary control over
preceding vehicles’ separation, without changing the attacker’s gain(s) can be provided.
























Fig. 2.9: Frequencies at which each vehicle in a ten vehicle platoon will resonate; non-linear
controller used for each vehicle, with unidirectional platoon algorithm. Attacker at position
nine.
proof 3 Allow datk to be the attacker’s desired spacing for the platoon and d the desired
platoon spacing in the absence of an attacker. Using these values with (5.1) for an attacker
in the first position (rear of the platoon), it has been shown that at steady state (i.e. v̇1 =
v̇2 = · · · = v̇n = 0 and v1 = v2 = · · · = vn):
ẋ1 = v1
v̇1 = −kpx1 + kpx2 − kpdatk = 0
ẋ2 = v2
v̇2 = kpx1 − kpx2 + kpd




v̇n−1 = kpxn−2 − kpxn−1 + kpd




Rearranging and canceling terms for v̇1, it has been found that x2 − x1 = datk. Substituting
this value recursively into the subsequent v̇i equations yields xi − xi−1 = datk for 1 < i <
n− 1. Following the same procedure for an attacker in the jth position, it can be shown that
xi+1 − xi = d for 1 < i < j and xi+1 − xi = datk for j < i < n− 1.
∴ For all vehicles preceding them, the attacker is able to specify the spacing policy.
The utility of this attack lies in an attacker being able to set datk ≤ 0, which results in
the platoon collapsing in on itself (more negative values of datk will cause this to happen at
greater relative velocities). By setting datk ∼ sinωt an attacker would cause vehicles in the
platoon to oscillate back and forth in a controlled manner that would not invite collisions.
Such movements would force vehicles to brake and accelerate, continuously, which would
cause excess energy expenditure (i.e. wasting of fuel).
2.6 Summary
In this chapter, it has been shown that a single, maliciously controlled vehicle can
destabilize a vehicular platoon, to catastrophic effect, through local modifications to the
prevailing control law. Specifically, by combining changes to the gains of the associated law
with the appropriate vehicle movements, the attacker can cause the platoon to oscillate at
a resonant frequency, causing accidents that could result in serious injury or death. The
range of gains and their corresponding frequencies, that allow an attacker to violate the
string stability and stability criteria at different positions in the platoon are determined.
Furthermore, it is proved that the attack can be successful at any position in the platoon
and at frequencies that can be realized by the other vehicles in the platoon. This work
implies that neither the string stability nor stability conditions, when used singly, ensure
proper platoon operation, and that neither can be used to ensure the other. Finally, it
is shown that an attacker is theoretically capable of gaining control over the individual




Reachability Analysis of the Vehicular Platooning
3.1 Background and Contribution of This Work
Platooning, also known as Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC), is character-
ized as a group of vehicles with coordinated movement. Platooning has been investigated
for around 4 decades [87]. The main objective of platooning is to reduce the inter-vehicle
distance significantly compared to what is considered advisable during manual driving.
Among the potential benefits are a better use of the road infrastructure by allowing more
vehicles to use a given stretch of road, improved energy efficiency by reducing aerodynamic
drag, increased highway safety due to the reduction of human mistakes, and reduced traffic
congestion [136]. Huge body of research involves longitudinal and lateral control of vehicle
platoon [20, 75, 118, 126, 129, 132]. The main concept in platoon control is string stabil-
ity. String stability deals with how errors are propagated through the vehicle string due
to disturbances or the reference trajectory of the formation lead. A string-stable control
form means that spacing errors between adjacent vehicles do not grow or amplify along the
vehicle string [90,125].
While many features of platooning are active areas of research, e.g. transportation
impacts, environmental, mechanical and control concerns [29,87,94,99,138], comparatively
little work has examined platooning in an adversarial environment and among those, most
papers challenge platoon security from communication aspect [86]. A few works that per-
formed security analysis on control in platooning can be grouped into categories of attack
design [28,44–46] and mitigation strategies [24]. It has been verified by recent studies that
attacks on platooning components may cause physical damages and threaten their normal
functions. Research works are mostly seeking the drawbacks in controls and trying to ma-
nipulate the vulnerabilities like modification of control law such that attacker can create
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catastrophic impacts on platoon. This type of impacts included, but are not limited to,
collision in high relative velocity to maximize the damage or oscillation to cause passenger
discomfort and increase fuel consumption [28, 44, 50]. A scenario wherein a group of ma-
licious vehicles on a highway perform a cooperative attack for creating undesirable wave
effects among other vehicles are investigated. The mathematical analysis to choose the
undesirable wave is presented in [67]. This investigation helps to understand the effect of
drivers behavior on traffic formation. In [28] attacker changes its gains such that system
becomes unstable and authors, at the end, briefly introduce the controllability of attacker
over platoon. To investigate this idea thoroughly, reachability of the platoon in presence of
attacker is studied, which can give clear picture of attacker capability in affecting position
and velocity of other vehicles in platoon, with its own motion involving acceleration or de-
celeration. However, the research works mentioned above focus on only designing attacks
and disrupting the platoon. The important challenge remaining is to provide guarantees for
successful attack. Two intriguing questions in this context are: (a) Will the attacker be able
to carry out the attack successfully? (b) Will the vehicles collide under control constraints?
This problem implies that the attack should be designed with a more comprehensive anal-
ysis.
This work is devoted to the analysis of reachability properties of vehicular platooning
under attack. Reachability analysis determines the set of states that the system can possibly
visit within finite or infinite time when started from a bounded set of possible input and
parameter values. The Exact reachable set can be computed for special cases with few states.
Except for the simplest of examples, analytic verification of reachable set for continuous
and hybrid systems is rarely possible. With the goal of broadening the applicability and
automating the process, numerical methods for verifying or validating such properties have
been the subject of much study. Several papers in the literature deal with approaches for
reachability set computation. Reachable sets and the optimal time to reach a target for
a controlled nonlinear system is characterized using Hamilton Jacobi equation with state
constraints in [10]. An algorithm which can numerically compute the backward reachable
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set for a two player, nonlinear differential game with a general target set is proposed in [104].
This algorithm is based on a formulation of reachability in terms of the viscosity solution of
a time-dependent Hamilton-Jacobi-Bellman partial differential equation. Hamilton-Jacobi
methods to reach-avoid problems with time-varying dynamics, targets, and constraint have
applications in game theory and optimal control problems. Hamilton-Jacobi methods for
such applications including pursuit-evasion, differential games, and safety certificates for
dynamical systems are extended in [64]. Any reachability analysis performed so far on
vehicle platoon or any vehicular formation was for the purpose of collision avoidance [14,
15,19] or fuel consumption minimization [53].
Approximation of reachable sets is one major category of numerical methods. Reach-
able set can be over or under-approximated. Obviously, over-approximated reachable states
can contain states which are not practically achievable and minimizing over-approximation
results in high computational cost. Hence, under-approximation techniques are more reli-
able approach.
Currently, the analysis of the vehicle platoon systems cannot tractably provide the
exact reachable set if the number of vehicles is large. In this work, under approximated
reach set for platoon of vehicles under attack is studied. For the longitudinal control, the
Proportional Derivative (PD) control for Bidirectional information flow [142] is used to
produce a sequence that minimizes spacing, relative velocity and the cost of traveling from
an origin to any destination. The extent of performance disruption of the platoon facing
attack is studied using ellipsoidal method and the attacker’s goal satisfaction are analyzed
using homogeneous model for all vehicles. First, reachable states for a single motion change
attack, is studied. Then, in the event of the integral attack (motion and gain modification),
potential impacts are investigated. We demonstrate the platoon states whilst facing two
representative attack scenarios and discuss the attacker’s control over platoon performance
in each scenario.
To the best of my knowledge, reach set computation for the attacker has not been
investigated in the literature. In this work, the attacker’s capabilities, based on its position
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in the platoon and the type of attack are discussed and detailed examination of reachable
set for two attack scenarios under input constraints are presented. This study gives a
profound knowledge of what the attacker is really capable of accomplishing, under physical
constraints in practical cases.

















Fig. 3.1: An n-vehicle platoon employing a bi-directional control law. Arrows represent the
flow of information.
3.2 Preliminaries
Reachability analysis computes all possible states a system can attain, and in this sense
provides knowledge about the system with completeness, or coverage, that a finite number
of simulation runs cannot deliver, due to its inherent complexity.
Reachability analysis is concerned with the computation of the reachable set in a way
that can effectively meet some types of requests. These requests include [65]: (a) determi-
nation of non-empty intersection of the reach set and the target set; (b) finding a feasible
initial condition; (c) control that steers the system from this initial condition to the given
reachable state in given time.
Several methods in the literature propose algorithms to calculate the reachable set of
the system like methods based on ellipsoidal representations [92], techniques using support
functions [69], and applying Hamilton Jacobi Isac (HJI) equations to differential equations
[104]. As the number of the states increases, it becomes harder to calculate the exact
reachable set of the system by admissible inputs. Hence, some of the existing methods
suggest some approximation algorithms to find the reachable set.
Ellipsoidal method is proposed for calculating reachable set for continuous time linear
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system under input constraints in [91] and [16]. In [91], the authors proposed that they can
estimate the reachable tube for the general linear time invariant system described in (3.1),
ẋ = Ax+Bu t0 ≤ t ≤ T (3.1)
where x ∈ Rn, u ∈ Rm, A ∈ Rn×n, and B ∈ Rn×m are states, inputs, and matrices
describing dynamic of the system, respectively.
Definition 3.2.1 The reachable set R[x, T ] = R(T, t0, X0) of the system (3.1) at time T
from a set of initial states X0 and time t0 is the set of all points x for which there exists a
trajectory x(s, t0, X0), x0 ∈ X0 that transfers the system from (t0, x0) to (T, x), x = x(T ),
while satisfying the associated constraints [145].
Similarly, the reachable tube is the set of all reachable sets over a time interval.
Definition 3.2.2 The reachable tube is all values (3.1) can meet during [t0, T ] and is math-
ematically defined as Tu(x, T ) =
⋃
t∈[t0,T ]R(t, t0, X0) [145].
Assuming some constraints on the input, the admissible set of inputs is u(t) ∈ P (t),
where P (t) is non-degenerate ellipsoid continuous in t,
P (t) = ξ(q(t), Q(t))
= {u(t) : (u− q(t)), Q−1(t)(u− q(t)) ≤ 1}
(3.2)
where q(t) ∈ Rm is the center and positive definite matrix Q(t) ∈ Rm×m is matrix of
ellipsoid.
The response of the system can be obtained using




Extending (3.3) to ellipsoidal calculation for reachable set results in
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Above, the reachable set computation using Ellipsoidal toolbox is described.
3.3 Problem statement
The analysis focuses on exploiting longitudinal control laws and input of the vehicles
in platoon, which are intended to maintain desired separation and velocity as they follow
straight line. Assuming all vehicles are traveling in one dimension, attacker gets the chance
to influence other vehicles’ motion via manipulating longitudinal control algorithm.
3.3.1 Platoon Model
The bi-directional (predecessor-follower) proportional-derivative (PD) controller is used
to demonstrate the impact of a malicious actor on platooning operations. This control law
is capable of maintaining a constant separation, d, between vehicles, based solely on local
sensing. This is important because it allows us to show that an attacker can affect the
platoon solely through malicious movement and need not rely on interfering with inter-
vehicle communication. Formally, the dynamics of a platoon with n vehicles employing this








p(x1 − x2 + d) + k2p(x3 − x2 − d),






p (xn−2 − xn−1 + d) + kn−1p (xn − xn−1 − d),
+ kn−1d (vn−2 − vn−1) + k
n−1




pxn−1 − knpxn + knp d+ knd vn−1 − knd vn + ul
(3.5)
where xi and vi represent the position and velocity of the ith vehicle, respectively (ȧ denotes
the first derivative with respect to time of the variable a), and kip and k
i
d represent their
proportional and derivative gains, respectively. For normal platooning operations kip and
kid are the same for each vehicles (thus the superscripts are ignored unless referring to the
gains for a vehicle in a particular position). kp is traditionally fixed at 1, while kd varies
according to the size of the platoon [28]. Here, ul represents the control input for the leader
(nth vehicle). In the steady-state ul is generally taken to be equal to zero; however, it is
noted that knp 6= 0 and knd 6= 0 implies that the followers would be able to influence the
leader’s movements, unless ul is set to cancel out the follower movements, which would
effectively set knp = k
n
d = 0. In any case, from the security perspective it seems inadvisable
for followers to be able to influence the leader.
3.3.2 Threat Models
The behavior of platoon in presence of malicious vehicle and the scope of deviation from
its normal performance, traveling at a constant speed with constant spacing are studied.
Two attack scenarios are investigated: In the first attack, the attacker attempts to take
control of all the states and brings them to desired and arbitrary states solely through its
motion. This raises a question about how probable is it that the attacker will successfully
accomplish his goal. In this attack, attacker chooses its gains, as other vehicles in the
platoon but it uses its own acceleration/deceleration to influence other vehicles states. The
attacker’s vehicle is considered to have exactly the same capabilities as the other vehicles
in the platoon.
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In the second attack scenario, the attacker implements an integral attack where at-
tacker takes advantage of motion modification while it modifies its control algorithm. The
attacker’s capability during the integral attack is analyzed. The attack model would be
similar to (5.2) and the corresponding row to the attacker in A matrix would be modified
like [28].
In order to, demonstrate the extent of the attacker’s capability of controlling platoon-
ing operations with being assigned nominal control of the platoon, it is assumed that the
attacker does not act as the leader of the platoon.
The equivalent state-space representation of the linear time-invariant (LTI) system
defined by (5.1) in the presence of an attacker is
Ẋ = AX +BU
Y = CX
(3.6)
where X = [x1, v1, x2, v2, · · · , xn, vn]> ∈ R2n are the states of all the vehicles in the
platoon and Y is the output, which in this case is similar to states, A ∈ R2n×2n, B ∈ R2n×2,
C ∈ R2n×2n, and U = [ul ua]ᵀ. C is the identity matrix (because it is assumed that all the
vehicle states are measurable), B has non-zero entries corresponding to the leader and the
attacker control, ul and ua, respectively, where ua is the attacker’s input in order to achieve
the desired states for both attacks.
zi = xi − xi+1 + d
yi = ẋi − ẋi+1 = vi − vi+1
(3.7)
The states to be controlled by the attacker are relative position and relative velocity.
So, the system of equation, (5.1) is transformed to (3.8), where attacker is in ith position
in the platoon. In case there are n vehicles in the platoon, number of states in absolute
coordinate (5.1) is 2n for positions and velocities. On the other hand, using error coordinate
(3.7) and (3.8), there are 2n − 2 states, zi and yi, which are spacing and relative velocity,
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respectively. Leader of the platoon would be counted as the nth vehicle in platoon, as shown
in Fig. 5.1, and it is assumed that all vehicles in platoon follow the normal control law in
motion modification attack described in (3.8).
ż1 = y1
ẏ1 = −2kpz1 + kpz2 − 2kdy1 + kdy2
ż2 = y2
ẏ2 = kpz1 − 2kpz2 + kpz3
+ kdy1 − 2kdy2 + kdy3
...
żi−1 = yi−1
ẏi−1 = kpzi−2 − 2kpzi−1 + kpzi
+ kdyi−2 − 2kdyi−1 + kdyi − ua
żi = yi
i̇2 = kpzi−1 − 2kpzi + kpzi+1
+ kdyi−1 − 2kdyi + kdyi+1 + ua
żi+1 = yi+1
ẏi+1 = kpzi − 2kpzi+1 + kpzi+2
+ kdyi − 2kdyi+1 + kdyi+2
...
żn−2 = yn−2
ẏn−2 = kpzn−3 − 2kpzn−2 + kpzn−1




ẏn−1 = kpzn−2 − kpzn−1 + kdyn−2 − kdyn−1 − ul
Then, A and B matrices using error coordinate can be formed as (3.9) and (5.3).
The attacker in the first attack scenario only implements motion modification where the B
matrix is modified. Single attacker only tries to control platoon by its own motion in which
B matrix is described as a single-column with entries 1 at 2ith and -1 at 2i−1th rows, where
i is the place of the attacker in the platoon. If the second vehicle is considered to be the












In the integral attack, attacker combines the motion modification in the former attack
with its gains modification and applies the changes to its corresponding row of A matrix.
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A = 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
−2kp −2kd kp kd 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 · · · 0
kp kd −2kp −2kd kp kd 0 · · · 0
. . .
0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 · · · 0 0 0 kp kd −kp −kd

(3.10)
The changes to A matrix is described as follows: Allow A(i, j) to represent access to the
element at the ith row and jth column of A. When an attacker is present at the first position,
A(2, 1) = −kp − k̃p
A(2, 2) = −kd − k̃d
(3.11)
An attacker in the ith position, 1 < i < n− 1, changes the following elements of (5.3)
A(2(i− 1), 2(i− 1)− 1) = kp − k̃p,
A(2(i− 1), 2i− 1) = k̃p,
A(2i, 2(i− 1)− 1) = k̃p,
A(2i, 2i− 1) = −kd − k̃p
A(2(i− 1), 2(i− 1)) = kd − k̃d,
A(2(i− 1), 2i) = k̃d,
A(2i, 2(i− 1)) = k̃d,
A(2i, 2i) = −kd − k̃d
(3.12)
When the attacker’s position is i = n− 1,
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A(2(i− 1), 2(i− 1)− 1) = kp − k̃p
A(2(i− 1), 2(i− 1)) = kd − k̃d
(3.13)
Where derivative and proportional gains of the attacker shown using k̃d and k̃p.
3.4 Reachability Analysis and Simulation Results
In this section, the attacker’s capability to disrupt the stable navigation of the platoon
is analyzed and the efficiency of the attack is measured through reachable set. Efficiency of
the attack would be measured through attacker’s power to cause collisions between vehicles
or cause the stop-then-go motion, which causes discomfort to passengers and increase in
fuel consumption. Alinear model (5.2) is considered for the platoon where attacker modifies
input set while it follows the platoon control law using stable gains or it compromises
the platoon via changing entries in A and ua. In spite of system controllability analysis,
which indicates platoon would be able to reach any arbitrary states proposed in [28] for
the vehicle platoon, it can be clearly evidenced that attack is not feasible in stable case.
This infeasibility stems from the small controllability grammian matrix determinant, which
results in a huge control effort. Furthermore, when attacker changes its gains to unstable or
marginally stable ones, it can actuate platoon to more diverse desired states. To clarify the
difference of the two scenarios described in (5.2) - (5.5), the reachable sets of the system in
both cases are computed and demonstrated for a small size platoon.
3.4.1 Reachability Analysis of the Platoon During Motion Modification Attack
A set of states for vehicles in platoon where attacker can steer states of vehicles towards
them through its own constrained motion is investigated. More specifically, given that
platoon already reached its desired constant spacing and velocity before the attack starts,
the most severe impact that the attacker can cause when its acceleration and deceleration
are bounded the ua ∈ [uamin , uamax ] is desired. This analysis is for the purpose of verifying
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attacker’s capability to compromise the system. As explained, let the initial states and
input sets of attacker be the ellipsoids. Initial set ξ(x0, X0) for the (3.7), x0 = 0 and X0 is a
very small deviation around 0 and admissible input set for the single attacker ξ(q(τ), Q(τ))
is a line stretched between [uamin , uamax ].
Fig. 3.2: Platoon reachable set and tube for T(s) duration of motion modification attack,
when attacker is in the first place.
3.4.2 Reachability Analysis of the Platoon During Integral Attack
During integral attack, attacker adds the control law modification attack on top of its
erratic acceleration and deceleration to make more impact. The rationale is, changing gain
for the attacker causes the platoon system to lose its symmetric structure, and even become
more controllable from attacker perspective. In some cases, such control offers the attacker
a broader range of impact. Therefore, attacker carries out motion modification attack with




The reachable sets for motion modification and integral attack scenarios are demon-
strated for the 5-vehicle platoon model. The reachable sets using Ellipsoid toolbox are
computed.
Fig. 3.3: Platoon reachable set and tube for T(s) duration of motion modification attack,
when attacker is in the second place.
First, the reach set for the motion modification attack is shown. The attack happens
when platoon already reached the steady state utilizing stable gains kp = 1 and kd = 3.3.
5-Vehicle platoon model involves 8 states which makes it hard to present the reachable sets
graphically. Therefore, a projection for the demonstration purposes is applied to the results.
In each case the reach tube and reach set for time T = 10(s) is provided, where input limits
for the attacker are considered to be [−5, 5]. Reachable sets and tubes of the platoon for
different positions of the attacker using a motion modification attack are presented in Figs.
3.2, 3.3, ,3.4 and 3.5. Reachable relative velocity values are shown versus spacing values in
each figure.
The reach set demonstration gives us a clear understanding of the extent that attacker,
in each position is able to deviate platoon from its normal vehicle following motion and the
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Fig. 3.4: Platoon reachable set and tube for T(s) duration of motion modification attack,
when the attacker is in the third place.
severity of the attack in case of accidents. The analysis to determine whether the attacker
is able to cause any collision between vehicles is based on (3.7). Collision happens when
following vehicle hits or passes predecessor while moving in the same lane. Necessary and
sufficient condition for the collision occurrence is presented as (5.19),
zi ≥ d. (3.14)
Comparing desired spacing with the reachable set for the spacing, the instances of
collision can be recognized.
For clarification, it is assumed that d = 4m, comparing (5.19) with Figs. 3.2 - 3.5,
attacker in all positions is able to cause collisions between vehicles in front, but not the
following ones. Observing the relative velocity values for all cases, it is shown that the
collision happens when vi = vi+1 ± 0.2, which barely cause any damage to the vehicles.
Higher relative velocity during collisions results in more severe damages. Reachable tubes
present a constant pattern after 7(s) and reachable set for longer attack duration than 7(s)
remain the same.
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Fig. 3.5: Platoon reachable set and tube for T(s) duration of motion modification the attack,
when the attacker is in the fourth place.
Fig. 3.6: Platoon reachable set and tube for T(s) duration of integral attack, when the
attacker is in the first place.
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Fig. 3.7: Platoon reachable set and tube for T(s) duration of integral attack, when attacker
is in the second place.
Fig. 3.8: Platoon reachable set and tube for T(s) duration of integral attack, when attacker
is in the third place.
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Fig. 3.9: Platoon reachable set and tube for T(s) duration of integral attack, when attacker
is in the fourth place.
, Attacker randomly selects stable gains k̃p = 0.4 and k̃d = −0.1, such that all system
eigenvalues remain in left half plane. Attacker uses the same range of input [−5, 5] as
motion modification attack to carry out integral attack. Corresponding reach set and tube
for attacker in first position are presented in Fig. 3.6. Comparing the results for the
same position of the attacker in two attack scenarios, Fig. 3.2 and Fig. 3.6, the attacker
has broader range of impact in latter case, where attacker can cause collision in speed
of vi = vi+1 ± 3. Attacker reach set grows as position of the attacker moves toward the
leader of platoon as shown in Figs. 3.7 - 3.9, where attacker collide into leader in speed of
vi = vi+1 ± 5. Reachable tube in Fig. 3.9 represents oscillatory movement which causes
passenger discomfort and increases fuel consumption.
3.4.4 Discussion and Future work
Reachability analysis is proven useful to learn destructive attacks against vehicular
platooning. Through the investigation, several points regarding reach set are surfaced,
which are briefly pointed out as follows: In attacks involving motion modification, attacker
states has the largest reachable set among other members and it grows larger as position
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of the attacker moves towards leader in integral attack. While moving away from attacker
the impact decreases on victims in both direction, and decreasing rate in direction pointing
to the first vehicle is greater than the rate towards the leader. Duration of integral attack
affects the reach set and in case of utilizing unstable gains, platoon reach set is very large
and grows exponentially with time.
3.5 Summary
In this chapter, a method based on reachable set theory to investigate adversarial be-
havior in automated vehicle platoons is proposed. Vehicular platoons have been developed
to increase highway throughput and safety, and to enhance driving comfort. The resulting
deployment of Cyber-physical technology in critical infrastructure is increasingly attractive
to both hackers and security researchers. To ensure safety and privacy of vehicle occupants,
it is essential to identify the vulnerabilities of platoon systems. In this chapter, the at-
tacker’s capabilities under input constraints during two types of attack are studied: motion
modification and integral attacks. Using ellipsoidal techniques, the extent of an attacker’s
ability to manipulate the control variables and states of a platoon resulting in oscillatory




Detection of the Attacker in Vehicular Platooning under Attack
4.1 Background and Contribution of This Work
Information and communication technologies have had a rapid development over the
last few years and attracted many interests to their application in real-world processes. This
expansion has led to the emergence of closed-loop systems involving strong integration and
coordination of physical and cyber (computational and communication) components, often
referred to as Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS). Actually, the key feature of these systems is
their ability to interact with, and expand the capabilities of, the physical world through
computation, communication, and control. CPS applications range from daily life usage
such as healthcare and smart grid systems to large-scale industrial applications and critical
infrastructures such as water and transportation.
Cyber-physical systems are prone to failures and attacks on their physical infrastruc-
ture, and cyber attacks on their data management and communication layer. These attacks
can vary in complexity and their target and can cause faults and failures in the physical
process of the system. Increasing dependence on CPS in vital infrastructures and criti-
cal processes have risen the concern and demand for CPS to be inevitably secure, robust,
reliable and trustworthy.
However, CPS suffer from specific vulnerabilities which do not affect classical control
systems, and for which appropriate detection and identification techniques need to be de-
veloped. This realization led to the emergence of security challenges that are distinct from
traditional network security. On the other hand, current information security methods,
such as authentication, access control, and message integrity, are not powerful enough to
completely secure and protect CPS.
In literature, several possible attacks against the control structure of cyber-physical
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systems have been formulated with a focus on integrity attacks where an adversary alters a
subset of control inputs, sensor measurements or control laws including replay [106], false
data injection [97], zero dynamics [114], covert [131] and destabilizing [28] attacks.
In general, the attacks on CPS affecting communication can be classified into two
categories [79]. These attacks share some common features with attacks on control. The
first class of the attacks includes the attacks that prevent the exchange of information like
jamming and DOS attacks while the second class of the attacks incorporates the false data
injection in information packets. The second class is more difficult to identify and hence
they are more detrimental to CPS security.
Due to the rising interest in improving the reliability of CPS, a significant research effort
has been carried out to overcome the limitations of security algorithms in CPS and detect
and handle failures in control systems. In recent years, few methods are being developed
which are capable of tolerating component malfunctions whilst still maintaining desirable
performance.
However, a key challenge in cyber-physical defense is a fast online detection and lo-
calization of faults and intrusions without prior knowledge of the failure type. Few attack
detection algorithms have been proposed in the literature that can automatically detect and
mitigate targeted attacks and failures. Authors in [114] studied detectability and identifi-
ability of the attack based on changes that attacker can cause to the output and analyzed
fundamental monitoring limitations for cyber-physical systems under attack modeled by
linear time invariant descriptor systems with exogenous inputs. Yet, the attack is uniden-
tifiable and undetectable when it excites zero dynamics.
Active detection methods to reveal stealthy attacks via manipulation of control inputs
and dynamics have been proposed in [109]. In [109], a method of physical watermarking
to authenticate the nominal behavior of a control system is proposed. Specifically, in this
approach, a known noisy control input is purposely injected to detect replay attacks by
analyzing the output of the system. The problem of secure state estimation, i.e. capability
of reconstructing the state when CPS of interest is under attack, has been studied in [110,
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130, 143]. Under the assumption of linear systems subject to an unknown but bounded
number of false-data injection attacks, the problem for a noise-free system has been cast into
an l0-optimization problem, which can be relaxed as a more efficient convex problem [60],
and later adapted to systems with bounded noise [112]. A model-based detection scheme
that leverages the broadcast nature of dedicated short range communication (DSRC) is
designed in [50] to detect a set of insider attacks in the vehicular platoon. Each car uses
DSRC messages from other cars in the platoon to model the expected behavior of the car
directly preceding it. If the expected behavior and actual behavior differ for the monitoring
vehicle, the vehicle would be flagged as an attacker.
This work belongs to the family of studies that addresses gain modification and desta-
bilizing attacks against Cyber-Physical System. The focus in this study is on less explored
Cyber-security concerns in CPS and proposing an attack detection scheme. In terms of
the methodology used in this work, the identification method and thresholding/clustering
method, which is novel in detection field are combined. The proposed method is also com-
putationally efficient, unlike most of the previously proposed approaches. To the best of
author’s knowledge, only in [82], an identification method for destabilizing attacks on power
systems is proposed. Authors proposed an Unscented Kalman Filter (UKF) to identify the
compromised buses in power systems. The proposed method can be considered as an ef-
fective method for the cyber-physical systems like vehicular platooning and power systems
under not only destabilizing attack but also any gain modification attack in presence of
noise. Moreover, the detection method is only based on prior knowledge on order of each
subsystem and it does not require any further knowledge of the normal and adversarial
parameters, number and place of attackers. The efficiency of the proposed algorithm is
proved through illustrative example on vehicle platooning in an adversarial environment.
4.2 Problem Statement
In this section, models for Cyber-Physical Systems in presence of attack are introduced.




Cyber physical system is considered to be a linear time-invariant system. The equiva-
lent state-space representation of the linear-time-invariant (LTI) system in discrete time is
defined by (4.1):
xk+1 = Axk +Buk + wk
yk = Cxk + vk
(4.1)
where xk ∈ Rn is the state vector at time instant k and uk ∈ Rm is control input. yk ∈ Rp
is the vector of sensor measurements. wk is the independent and identically distributed
(IID) process noise with the probability distribution given by wk ∼ N(0, Q) where Q > 0.
Meanwhile, vk is the IID measurement noise with distribution given by vk ∼ N(0, R) where
R > 0. It is assumed that (A,C) is detectable. Additionally, (A,B) and (A,Q1/2) are
assumed to be stabilizable. The set of measurements y are sent to the infrastructure in
order to monitor the performance of the process.
Cyber-Physical Systems can be described as distributed systems in which each subsys-
tem dynamic can be defined as a part of the larger system where its dynamic depends on
its own states and other subsystems in the network. Hence, (4.1) can be reformulated as:
xik+1 = Aixik +Ajxjk +Biuik + wik
yik = Cixik + vik
(4.2)
where i index shows the matrices and states of each subsystem and j 6= i is corresponding
to other parts of the complex system and can refer to multiple subsystems.
4.2.2 Attack Model
The case of a single (or multiple) malicious actor(s) in control of interconnected sys-
tems, who attempts to destabilize or create oscillatory behavior in the system is examined.
Attacker may accomplish this by causing the subsystem under its control to subvert or
ignore the control law established for maintaining the normal performance of the system.
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This implies that controller gains of the attackers could be modified [28, 44, 55, 82]. There-
fore, the attacker is capable of disrupting the normal operation of the system via altering
assigned nominal control parameters. An attacker can implement a gain modification attack
via state feedback and modify the corresponding rows in A in (4.1).
Furthermore, applying linear feedback control changes rows of Ai and Aj in (4.2).
System matrices in (4.2) are modified by the attacker as Ai = Ai−BiKi and Aj = Aj−BiKj
where Ki and Kj are the state feedback gains with matching dimensions, Bi has nonzero
entries for the external input to the corresponding subsystem. The subsystem equations
(4.2) can be rearranged in the new set of equations (4.3), where Ai only can be defined for
the states of the subsystem itself and all other variables affecting the subsystems’ dynamics
are counting as the input. So, (4.2) can be reformulated as
xik+1 = Aixik +Bni [uik ,xjk ] + wik
yik = Cixik + vik
(4.3)
where Bni is formed by a combination of Bi and Aj matrices. The states of the other
subsystem (coupling between subsystems) are considered as a new set of input to the sub-
system.
4.3 Detection method
In section 4.2.2, it is discussed how attackers influence system by changing their control
algorithms via their gains. Gain modification directly affects the system parameters and
results in different parameters for the attackers’ subsystems, i.e. parameters of the trans-
fer function or state space representation, comparing to other subsystems. The proposed
detection algorithm involves the following steps: 1)collecting the set of input-output data
of each subsystem 2)identifying the parameters of each subsystem 3)comparing parame-
ters/eigenvalues of all subsystems, and 4)detecting set of parameters/eigenvalues which do
not follow the major pattern.
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Two different approaches are applied to find each subsystem characteristics described
in (4.3): 1)State Space Identification approach 2) Transfer Function Identification approach.
The former approach is dealing with the state space representation of the system and
provides system matrices. For the detection purpose, Ai is chosen. This method is known
as subspace identification. The latter method is an alternative method for identification
of the system where parameters of the transfer function are estimated. The order of the
system is known and fitting a model to input and output data is out of the scope of this
work.
4.3.1 Identification Methods
Well matured area of system identification is comprised of various modeling techniques.
Modeling is the abstraction of a real process to characterize its behavior. Although most
of the analysis is in the interest of the continuous-time process, measurements are provided
in the discrete form. Hence, discrete time system identification is chosen due to the access
to discretized input and output data. In many cases, it is assumed that a signal x is set
to a value x(k) at time tk (where tk is the discrete time steps tk = kTs and Ts is sampling
period where k is an integer) and remains at that value until the next time step tk+1 (zero-
order hold (ZOH) discretization). Equation (4.4) can be reformulated as (4.1) using Euler’s
forward approximation of the first derivative of a continuous signal x that is sampled at
discrete time steps.
ẋ(t) = ACTx(t) +BCTu(t) + w(t)
y(t) = CCTx(t) + v(t)
(4.4)
where A = ACTTs + I, B = BCTTs and C = CCT , I is the identity matrix with the same
dimension as ACT . Transfer function identification in continuous time is the process of
modeling input and output relations in the Laplace domain. For continuous-time system
(4.4), transfer function can be obtained G(s) = CCT (SI −ACT )−1BCT and for the discrete
time system (4.1), using Z transform the transfer function would be G(Z) = C(ZI −
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A)−1B. Following, the system identification method for discrete time state space and
transfer function representation of the system are discussed.
State Space Identification
Subspace identification methods are used to identify the parameters (matrices) of LTI
state space model from the input and output data. Parameters of the identified linear
system are obtained from the row or the column subspace of a matrix, which is formed
from the input and output data. Using the sequence of input and output data, Hankel
matrix can be formed to use geometric and mathematical tools to find system matrices.
Input blocks for Hankel matrices are defined using,
Up =

u0 u1 . . . uj−1











ui ui+1 . . . ui+j−1





ui+h−1 ui+h . . . ui+h+j−2

. (4.6)













xi xi+1 . . . xi+j−1
] (4.8)
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The subscripts p and f refer to past and future, respectively. The number of block
rows i is a user-defined index which should at least be larger than the maximum order of
the system one wants to identify. The number of columns j is typically equal to s−i−h+1,
which implies that all given data samples (s) are used where it is assumed s→∞ and h = i.
Output block Y is constructed using the same method as input block. The instrumental







The extended observability and reversed extended controllability matrices are defined
as:
Γi = (C
T (CA)T . . . (CAi−1)T )T
∆i = ((A
i−1B)T (Ai−2B)T . . . BT )T
(4.10)
and the block Toeplitz matrix, Hi, is developed as
Hi =

D 0 . . . . . . 0
CB D 0 . . . 0






CAi−2B CAi−3B . . . CB D

. (4.11)
N4SID method [134,137] is used to find system matrices. The key step of this method
is the oblique projection of subspaces generated by the block Hankel matrices formed by
input/output data of the system using (4.5) - (4.8). Mathematical and geometrical tools
like SVD (Singular Value Decomposition) are used to extract the order of the system and
the observability matrix which contain the parameters of the estimated model. N4SID




Yp = ΓiXp +HiUp
Yf = ΓiXf +HiUf
(4.12)
It is assumed that the order of system is known. Hence, the steps for determining the
order of the system are skipped. In N4SID method, two weighting matrices are used where
W1 usually is an identity matrix and W2 should be chosen such that satisfies rank(Wp) =





and applying SVD decomposition,






 = U1S1V T1 (4.14)


















where T is a non-singular similarity transformation matrix. System matrices can be derived
using equations in (4.15). Matrix C is extracted directly from the first l rows of Γi where
is l is equal to number of outputs. The matrix A is determined from the shift structure of
Γi. Denoting
ΓiA = Γi (4.16)
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where Γi is the Γi without last p rows where yk ∈ Rp, equation (4.16) can be rewritten as
A = Γ†iΓi (4.17)
If Yf in equation (4.12) multiplied by Γ
⊥




i Γi = 0, and can











M = LHi (4.19)
A system of equations (4.19) which are function of B and D is resolved by a linear regression
algorithm.
Transfer Function Identification
The basic relationship between the input and outputs is the linear difference equation
y(k) + a1y(k − 1) + . . .+ any(k − n) = . . .
b1u(k − 1) + . . .+ bmu(k −m) + v(k)
(4.20)




n−2 + . . .+ bmz
n−m
zn + a1zn−1 + . . .+ an
H(z) =
zn
zn + a1zn−1 + . . .+ an
(4.21)
where system is causal (n ≥ m). The approach to calculate values of parameters of the
system, ai and bi, from observed data is needed. There are two inputs considered to the
system, one is the normal input as u(k) and the other is noise v(k). Therefore, there are two
transfer functions, G(z) which shows the relations between y and u and the other one H(z)
demonstrates how v would affect the output y. We choose ARX (Autoregressive with exoge-
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nous input) as the best fit for the system. If there is colored noise in the system, ARMAX
is more appropriate model. ARX takes advantage of optimization methods to estimate the
parameters of the system [ai bj ], such that the error between the real measurement and
output with estimated value get close to zero.
4.3.2 Detection and Localization of the Attacker
Once the parameters of each subsystem is identified, a measure is applied to distinguish
misbehaving subsystem from other subsystems. The proposed schemes to determine the
attacker, Clustering and Thresholding, are applied to the parameters of system obtained
from identification step.
Recall from the attack model, attacker changes at least one of its gains in order to affect
the characteristics of the system. This modification leads to different system matrices or
transfer function with unlike parameters than normal subsystems. Hence, a malicious agent
is traceable via its different eigenvalues or parameter using former or latter identification
approaches. Sometimes, the attacker targets the stability of the system causing instability
or oscillation in the system. It can be safely concluded any subsystem has eigenvalues or
poles out of or on the unit circle is the attacker’s subsystem.
Clustering
K-means clustering algorithm is employed to automate the process of detecting anoma-
lies. K-means Clustering aims to partition n observations into a certain number of clusters
like k in which each observation belongs to the cluster with the nearest mean, serving as a






(‖xi − vj‖)2 (4.22)
where, ‖xi − vj‖ is the Euclidean distance between xi data points (eigenvalues or transfer
function coefficients) and vj center of each set. In this method, c is the number of clusters
which is randomly chosen and ci is the number of data points in the ith cluster. K-means
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clustering can be summarized as following steps: Let X = x1, x2, . . . , xn be the set of data
points and V = v1, v2, . . . , vc be the set of centers. 1) Randomly select c cluster centers,
2) Calculate the distance between each data point and cluster centers, 3) Assign the data
point to the cluster center whose distance from the cluster center is minimum of all the




j=1 xi, 5) Recalculate
the distance between each data point and new obtained cluster centers and 6) If no data
point was reassigned then stop, otherwise repeat from step 3).
Thresholding
Once the parameters of the system are identified, the anomaly detection method is
applied to the set of estimated data.. The main idea of anomaly detection algorithm is to
detect data instances in a data set, which deviate from the norm. The proposed method
is alternate approach to clustering in order to find the outliers. In statistics, an outlier is
an observation point that is distant from other observations and in the system, adversary
related parameters fall out of normal set. This method relies on statistical properties like
mean and standard deviation of the data points. The boundaries for the benign data
points are set to lie within k standard deviations of the mean. The normal data domain is
defined as d = µ± kσ where, µ = E[X] = 1
n
∑n
i=1 xi is the mean value of observations and
σ =
√
E[(X − µ)2] is the standard deviation. k is the coefficient which can be obtained by
trial and error. The attacker is detected using,
Attacker = argmax
i
(|parameter(i)− µ|, σ). (4.23)
4.4 Illustrative Example
In recent years, realization of secure vehicular platoon has been introduced as a new
challenge in the field of cyber-physical systems [25, 28, 44–46]. Platooning is characterized
by a tight coupling between vehicle’s physical dynamics (mobility) and the computing and
communications aspects of the vehicle. With rising public concern about transportation
issues such as roadway capacity, traffic congestion, and highway safety, interest in vehicle
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platoon has been increasing and automated driving vehicles have been the subject of active
research over the last decade. However, the biggest concern regarding vehicle platoon and
autonomous vehicles is safety and reliability. In order to realize a safe and trustful vehicle
platoon system, using a reliable attack detection algorithm is a key enabling technology. In
this section, proposed methods are applied to the vehicular platooning in presence of the
adversary and the detection results are demonstrated.
4.4.1 Platoon and Threat Models
In attack scenario, which is under investigation, the attacker focuses on the exploita-
tion of longitudinal control schemes, which are intended to allow an automated vehicles to
maintain a desired separation/velocity from vehicles’ immediate neighbor as they travel a
straight path. A coupled and cooperative system of vehicles traveling on a straight trajec-
tory at a constant velocity is considered. Vehicle convoy is assumed to be homogeneous in
terms of performance characteristics and utilize the same control law for all participants.
There is a central unit present as an essential infrastructure of the intelligent highway sys-
tem to monitor the vehicle performance and has access to all vehicles’ data, i.e., velocity
and position.
Control laws govern how a vehicle should behave with respect to the movements of
the preceding vehicle. Due to this interaction, the system of cooperative vehicles can be
described using coupled differential equations. A stream of n vehicles can be described as
follows:
ẋ1 = v1





v̇n−1 = kp(xn − xn−1 − hẋn−1) + kd(ẋn − ẋn−1)
ẋn = vn
v̇n = u.
The equivalent state-space model of the linear-time-invariant (LTI) system defined by
(4.24) is represented by (4.4): where x(t) = [x1, v1, x2, v2, ..., xn−1, vn−1, xn, vn]
> ∈ R2n
are the vehicle states, ACT ∈ R2n×2n, BCT ∈ R2n×2, CCT ∈ R2n×2n, and u is a scalar input.
Because all the vehicle states are assumed to be measurable, CCT is an identity matrix.
BCT has one non-zero entry for the lead vehicle’s input and kp, kd, and h represent system
gains.
Attack plot [55] involves a multi-attacker scenario where one active attacker directly
controls vehicles’ traveling by its motion and using modified gains for its control algorithm
(4.25) and it is placed behind the leader of the platoon. Additionally, one or multiple passive
attackers, following a modified control law (4.26), are present in the stream of vehicles as
shown in Fig.4.1. Gains of passive attackers are determined deliberately to cause oscillation
in the desired acceleration. The passive attacker vehicles could be colluding with other
vehicles as a result of the exploit. All other vehicles in the platoon are considered victim
vehicles. The leader of the platoon is denoted as a nth vehicle. Stability of the system under
attack is investigated in [55].
v̇a = kpa(xa+1 − xa − hava) + kda(va+1 − va) + ua (4.25)
The active attacker, indicated by subscript a, changes its gains to kpa , kda and ha and
modifies its motion using ua . Subscript a+1 =n refers to the leader of the platoon. kpp , kdp
and hp are passive attackers’ selected gains,
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v̇i = kpp(xi+1 − xi − hpvi) + kdp(vi+1 − vi) (4.26)
The goal of the attackers is to introduce instability by modifying the elements of ACT in
(4.4) corresponding to each attacker so as to produce an unstable system, and then perturb
the system to ensure the system is forced out of steady state equilibrium. The overall effect
of the attack is a reduction in traffic flow stability and secondary impact is the possible
occurrence of collisions.
In order to present the detection problem in the form of (4.3), the whole platoon is
divided into the identification of one vehicle as the subsystem. The states and inputs of
each vehicle (subsystem) are described as X = [xi, vi]
T , u = [pi+1, vi+1]
T , and y is the
output vector that consists of all states of the vehicle. The measurement noise is n, where
n ∼ N(0, Rn). Ai, Bi and Ci = I are matrices of each vehicle in discrete time as follows,
Ai =  1 Ts
−kpiTs (−kdi − kpihi)Ts + 1

Bi =  0 0
kpiTs kdiTs

These matrices have the same structure for all passive attackers and normal vehicles
and in each case, entries are substituted by attackers’ or normal gains, respectively. A and
C matrices are the same for the active attacker and B matrix has another column for the
external input to active attacker ua.
The Two-input-Two-output system for each vehicle is considered and state space iden-
tification approach is applied to the set of inputs and outputs to identify the entries of the
matrix Ai and calculate eigenvalues from resulted matrix entries.
Since attacker mainly affects platoon through its gains and the system’s parameters
vary with different gains, system identification is a basic step in the detection approach.
Each vehicle input-output relation is described using 4 different transfer functions. Each
81
Active AttackerPassive Attacker
Fig. 4.1: System of automated vehicles in the presence of attackers
output according to superposition property of linear systems is the summation of the re-







with one zero and two poles which describe the relation between position and velocity of
the preceding vehicle as inputs and the position and velocity of each vehicle as outputs.
In next step, to identify the attacker, the parameters ax2,3 and bx1,2 , coefficients of
numerator and denominator of (4.27) using transfer function identification approach are
estimated.
Remark 1 As attacker mainly affects the relations between positions and velocities as in-
puts and outputs by changing gains,the same model considered for all vehicles (normal,
active and passive attacker) is considered. Given that, the external input to active attacker
does not influence the analysis.
4.4.2 Detection Results
As the second step to detect attacker, the parameters are estimated and the most
affected parameters from gain alteration scenario are identified. To test the efficiency of
the proposed detection approach, 1000 data sets of 101-vehicle platoon under the described
attack for various positions and numbers of attackers created using Monte Carlo simula-
tion are utilized. To demonstrate the efficiency of the method, a sample data set where
kp = 1, kd = 1.2746 and h = 1.166 is chosen. In this data set, the variance of noise on
measurements are 0.1 and attackers’ positions are [8 9 11 51 76 77 87 100] where vehicle 100
is the active attacker kda = −2 and the rest are passive attackers kdp = −0.8929. Vehicle
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101 is the leader and leader’s parameters are not included in the analysis. The sampling
period Ts is 1 second. The results of transfer identification approach are presented in Fig.
4.2 - Fig. 4.5. In Fig. 4.2, estimated parameters for
xi
xi+1
transfer function are shown.
Moreover, the thresholding results are included in each figure. Blue line shows the mean
and green line is the standard deviation from the mean. It can be concluded from Fig. 4.2
that attackers are distinguishable as their identified values are far from normal estimated




measures to identify the attackers.


































































demonstrated in Fig. 4.3 are not revealing noticeable
difference between victims and attackers. Thus, these parameters are not reliable measures







Figs. 4.4 and 4.5 are very small and it is not trustworthy measure to assess the benevolence
of each vehicle.




to determine the attackers’ vehicles are determined. There are two important factors in
detection scheme: 1) parameter that reflects difference in all data sets and 2) the number
of sample points included in attack detection window. The parameters a12 , a13 and b11 ,
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together and individually, and different duration for parameter identification are deployed
to achieve best true positive and false positive rates on data sets. Duration of each data
set is 1200(s) and best result is for [60(s)− 180(s)]. It is worth noting that in all the data
sets, attack has already started or going to happen in this duration and system is not in
steady state. The best true positive and false positive rates as presented in Table 4.1 are
for the case we set threshold on b11. The identified parameter belongs to the attacker if
b11(i) /∈ µ(b11)± σ(b11).
True positive rate (TPR) and false positive rate (FPR) using b11 for the different level
of noise in measurements are presented in Table. 4.1.
Table 4.1: Detection rates using transfer function (TF) and State Space (SS) attacker
detection scheme
Noise Variance TPR (TF) TPR (SS) FPR (TF) FPR (SS)
0 100 100 0 0
0.1 91.2 94.4 0.86 0.69
0.5 85.3 89.7 1.13 1.03
1 61.5 73.6 1.74 1.55
State space identification approach and detection algorithm are applied to same sample
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data set and computed eigenvalues and detection results are presented in Figs.4.6 and
4.7. Using state space identification results of A matrix, the eigenvalues of the system are
computed. Changing gains in the system results in the variation of eigenvalues which is
the key factor in detecting the attacker. This helps the clustering algorithm to categorize
the eigenvalue of the vehicle in two different groups and it is assumed that the attackers
are minority in vehicular platoon. Result of clustering is presented in Fig. 4.7. The results
illustrate that the proposed detection method is able to detect all attackers of platoon
successfully. Comparison of the detection rate for two proposed approaches is presented
in Table 4.1 and results indicate that state space identification approach combined with
clustering method is more efficient in detecting adversaries in platoon.























































































































Fig. 4.6: Eigenvalues of the system calculated from state space identification method
4.5 Summary
Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) are systems with tight coupling between integration of
physical, computational and networking components. Control systems play an important
role to help these systems to adhere to their desired performance. Having a reliable and
secure control system which can cope with high risk situations and various attacks is one
of the bottlenecks for real-world Cyber-physical systems. It has been proven that using
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Detection Using EigenValues and clustering
Eien Values for all vehicles
Eigen values of the attacker
Fig. 4.7: Attack detecting result using state space identification and clustering methods
control modification attack, where the adversary modifies the sensor information or the
control law, can disrupt the desired performance of the system. In this chapter, a novel
scheme is presented to detect and identify the attacker in control systems. The detection
algorithm is the combination of the system identification method and machine learning
technique which effectively recognizes the malicious actors. The proposed algorithm is
efficient, viable, and simply adequate to address the challenges posed by complex Cyber-
physical systems. Finally, the efficiency of the presented method is verified with the case of
platooning in an adversarial environment.
87
CHAPTER 5
Resilient Control for the Platooning in Adversarial Environment
5.1 Background and Contribution of This Work
Recent efforts in automotive industry point in the direction of increased content of
electronics, computers, and controls with an emphasis on the improved functionality, au-
tomation and overall system robustness. These endeavors result in emerging technologies
in the field of autonomous vehicles and Intelligent Transportation Systems (ITS) i.e. pla-
tooning. The platooning concept involves a group of vehicles acting as a single unit through
coordination of movements. While vehicle platooning can benefit human beings in various
aspects like decrease in the number of collisions due to human error, minimization of traffic
congestion as a result of the increase in highways throughput, and reduced fuel consump-
tion, there is a particular interest in security of vehicular platooning. It is an essential part
to this field and complicates the integration of this technology in real world.
There are three types of security challenges in CPS control systems. The first issue deals
with the security attacks and threats. In literature, several possible attacks against control
structure of Cyber-Physical Systems have been formulated with a focus on the attacks where
an adversary alters a subset of control inputs, sensor measurements or control laws including
replay [107], false data injection [97,105], zero dynamics [114], covert [131] and destabilizing
[28] attacks. The second challenge in securing the CPS against cyber attacks is to provide
the CPS with an attack detection algorithm. There exist several investigations on modeling
and detection of cyber attacks from network security and control systems perspectives. The
current state of the art methods used for cyber attack detection are Intrusion Detection
Systems (IDS) where they continuously monitor the system or network and generate alarms
to inform the system administrator of suspicious events [66, 123]. Authors in [114] studied
detectability and identifiability of the attack based on changes that attacker can cause to the
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output and analyzed fundamental monitoring limitations for cyber-physical systems under
attack modeled by linear time invariant descriptor systems with exogenous inputs. Yet, the
attack is unidentifiable and undetectable when it excites zero dynamics. Active detection
methods to reveal stealthy attacks via manipulation of control inputs and dynamics have
been proposed in [141]. A model-based detection scheme that leverages the broadcast
nature of dedicated short range communication (DSRC) is designed in [50] to detect a
set of insider attacks in the vehicular platoon. Novel detection approach based on system
identification and clustering for gain modification attack is proposed in [24]. The presented
approach estimates the parameters of each subsystem and locates all attackers through their
parameter when they deviate from mainstream. As the last but very crucial challenge of
cybersecurity in CPS, attack resiliency is of utmost importance to maintain the functional
CPS in the presence of cyber attacks. Authors comprehensively survey the concept and
strategies for building resilient and integrated cyber-physical systems in [78]. Mitigation
technique based on sliding mode controller coupled with an attack detection scheme, that
ensures that deviations from desired inter-vehicle separations remain low, is designed in
[121]. Sliding surface is designed based on errors in desired values for relative spacing
and velocity. Authors in [7] investigate resilient control under Denial of Service (DoS)
attack in connected vehicles application. Estimation scheme is added to the conventional
Cooperative Adaptive Cruise Control (CACC) control strategy to make the platoon resilient
to DoS attack.
One of the possibilities to enhance the performance of control algorithms and make
them robust against uncertainties is to extend its integer order element to fractional order
[36,37,39,100–102]. An increasing number of studies can be found related to the application
of fractional controllers in many areas of science and engineering [21, 22, 31, 33, 38, 41–43].
Podlubny [117] has proposed a generalization of the PID controller, namely the PIλDµ
controller, involving an integrator of order and differentiator of order (the orders may assume
real noninteger and nonnegative values). However, to the best knowledge of the authors, the
resilient control of Cyber-physical systems under attack using the fractional order controllers
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has not yet been studied.
The aim of this work is to propose an effective method to mitigate the attacker’s impacts
on the platoon under attack. This work falls under the category of resilient control design
for the platoon against the gain modification attacks. To cope with the security challenges
and threats, a novel fractional calculus-based technique is proposed to eliminate collisions
and undesired oscillations in the platoon under the gain modification and destabilizing
attacks. The aforementioned attacks not only can cause collisions in high relative velocities,
which result in catastrophic damages to vehicles in a platoon, but also can increase fuel
consumption due to oscillatory behavior. Hence, finding an effective way to reduce such
impacts can be of great importance. Considering the platoon dynamics in presence of
the adversary, in this study a fractional order controller is put forth to alleviate attacker’s
influence. The proposed approach is decentralized and the attacker can be controlled locally
after being detected. In this work, a stabilizing controller is designed to obtain a robustly
stable closed-loop system. The main contribution of this work is to propose a simple design
of a robust stabilizing fractional order controller for the systems under attack. While the
common and frequently used techniques to tackel the gain variation in classic control system
are sliding mode control and adaptive control [30,32,34,35,40] they are not efficient for the
system under the attack.The closest work to the proposed contribution is [121] where two
different controllers are considered for the platoon. There is switching between the control in
presence of attack and normal platooning control algorithm, which state is determined based
on attack detection algorithm. The drawback of this approach is the drastic change between
linear control and sliding mode control is not considered. The other issue regarding [121] is
that upon attack detection the configuration of the platoon is changed which is not advisable
and, in some cases, unfeasible in practice.
5.2 Problem statement
The controller design focuses on strengthening longitudinal control laws of the vehicles
in platoon, which are intended to maintain desired separation and velocity as they follow
straight line. Assuming all vehicles are traveling in one dimension, attacker gets the chance
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Fig. 5.1: An n-vehicle platoon employing a bi-directional control law. Arrows represent the
flow of information.
to influence other vehicles’ motion via manipulating longitudinal control algorithm.
5.2.1 Platoon Model
The bi-directional (predecessor-follower) proportional-derivative (PD) controller is used
to demonstrate the impact of a malicious actor on platooning operations. This control law
is capable of maintaining a constant separation, d, between vehicles, based solely on local
sensing. This is important because it allows us to show that an attacker can affect the
platoon solely through malicious movement. Formally, the dynamics of a platoon with n









p(x1 − x2 + d) + k2p(x3 − x2 − d),





p (xn−2 − xn−1 + d) + kn−1p (xn − xn−1 − d),
+ kn−1d (vn−2 − vn−1) + k
n−1





pxn−1 − knpxn + knp d+ knd vn−1 − knd vn + ul
(5.1)
where xi and vi represent the position and velocity of the ith vehicle, respectively (ȧ denotes
the first derivative with respect to time of the variable a), and kip and k
i
d represent their
proportional and derivative gains, respectively. For normal platooning operations kip and
kid are the same for each vehicles ( the superscript is omitted unless referring to the gains
for a vehicle in a particular position). The proportional gain kp is traditionally fixed at 1,
while kd varies according to the size of the platoon [28]. Here, ul represents the control
input for the leader (nth vehicle). In the steady-state ul is generally taken to be equal to
zero; however, it is noted that knp 6= 0 and knd 6= 0 implies that the followers would be able
to influence the leader’s movements, unless ul is set to cancel out the follower movements,
which would effectively set knp = k
n
d = 0. In any case, from the security perspective it seems
inadvisable for followers to be able to influence the leader.
5.2.2 Threat Models
The mitigation scheme for the platoon in presence of malicious vehicle is proposed. The
controller is designed for the platoon states, where attacker implements an attack through
modifying its control algorithm. A technique to eliminate the undesired effects of attack on
the platoon is proposed. The attack model would be similar to (5.2) and the corresponding
row to the attacker in A matrix would be modified like [28]. It is assumed that the attacker
does not act as the leader of the platoon.
The equivalent state-space representation of the linear time-invariant (LTI) system
defined by (5.1) in the presence of an attacker is
Ẋ = AX +BU
Y = CX
(5.2)
where X = [x1, v1, x2, v2, · · · , xn, vn]> ∈ R2n are the states of all the vehicles in the
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platoon and Y is the output, which in this case is similar to states, A ∈ R2n×2n, B ∈ R2n×1,
C ∈ R2n×2n, and U = [ul]ᵀ. C is the identity matrix (because it is assumed that all the
vehicle states are measurable), B has the non-zero entries corresponding to the leader and
the attacker control. A matrix using (5.1) can be formed as (5.3).
A = 
0 1 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0
−kp −kd kp kd 0 0 0 · · · 0
0 0 0 1 0 0 0 · · · 0
kp kd −2kp −2kd kp kd 0 · · · 0
. . .
0 · · · 0 0 0 0 0 0 1
0 · · · 0 0 0 kp kd −kp −kd

(5.3)
Leader of the platoon would be counted as the nth vehicle in the platoon, as shown in Fig. 5.1,
and it is assumed that all vehicles in platoon follow the normal control law in motion modification
attack described in (5.2) before the attack. In the gain modification attack, the attacker applies
the changes to its corresponding row of A matrix. The changes to A matrix is described as follows:
Allow A(i, j) to represent access to the element at the ith row and jth column of A. When an
attacker is present at the first position,
A(2, 1) = −k̃p,
A(2, 3) = k̃p,
A(2, 2) = −k̃d,
A(2, 4) = k̃d.
(5.4)
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An attacker in the ith position, 1 < i < n, changes the following elements of (5.3)
A(2i, 2(i− 1)− 1) = k̃p,
A(2i, 2i− 1) = −2k̃p,
A(2i, 2i+ 1) = k̃p,
A(2i, 2(i− 1)) = k̃d,
A(2i, 2i) = −2k̃d,
A(2i, 2(i+ 1)) = k̃d
(5.5)
where derivative and proportional gains of the attacker are shown using k̃d and k̃p.
5.3 Attack Mitigation Algorithm Design
To recover platoon from gain modification and destabilizing attacks, the use of fractional order
controller is suggested. The stability criterion is expanded by fractional order calculus and make
system robust against destabilizing attack. The proposed controller improves system performance
in presence of the adversary and reduce the number of collisions and undesired oscillatory movement
caused by the attacker. Fractional order controller guarantees speedy recovery from attack and least
damages to the vehicles in the platoon. The mitigation algorithm is incorporated into the system
based on the detection scheme proposed in [24]. The detection is based on system identification and
machine learning algorithm. The infrastructure receives all measurements (velocities and positions
of each vehicle) and estimate the parameter of each vehicle using adjacent vehicles’ measurement as
input and the velocity and position of the vehicle as output. Clustering is applied to the estimated
parameters of the system, resulted from system identification, to detect anomalies. The controller
is designed such that, it stabilizes the system and enables the defending cars to maintain the safe
distance with the other vehicles. In the controller design, it is assumed there is a communication
link between vehicles, where the defender can inject the control input to the attacker’s controller.
5.3.1 Fundamentals of fractional calculus and fractional order systems
Fractional-order integration and differentiation is the generalization of the integer-order ones.
Efforts to extend the specific definitions of the traditional integer order to the more general arbitrary
order context led to different definitions for fractional derivatives [48]. Two of the most commonly
used definitions are the Riemann-Liouville and Caputo definitions.
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Definition 5.3.1 Riemann-Liouville integration( [116]) The nth fractional-order Riemann-Liouville







Definition 5.3.2 ( [116]) One of the basic functions of the fractional calculus is Eulers Gamma





which converges in the right half of the complex plane, i.e. Re(z) > 0.
Definition 5.3.3 ( [116]) The αth-order RiemannLiouville fractional derivative of function f(t)













where m is the first integer larger than α, i.e. m− 1 ≤ α < m and Γ is the Gamma function
Definition 5.3.4 ( [116]) The Caputo fractional derivative of order α of a continuous function










(t−τ)α−m+1 dτ m− 1 < α < m
dm
dtm f(t) α = m
(5.9)
Theorem 1 [51] Consider the following n-dimensional linear fractional order system
dα1x1(t)
dtα1
= a11x1 + a12x2 + · · ·+ a1n,
dα2x2(t)
dtα2




= an1x1 + an2x2 + · · ·+ ann,
(5.10)
where all 0 < αi ≤ 1. Assume M is the lowest common multiple of the denominators udi’s of αi’s,
where αi = vdi/udi, (udi, vdi) = 1, udi, vdi ∈ Z+, for i = 1, 2, · · · , n. By defining
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∆(λ) = 
λMα1 − a11 a12 · · · a1n
a21 λ





an1 an2 · · · λMα1 − ann

(5.11)
Then the zero solution of system (5.11) is globally asymptotically stable in the Lyapunov sense if
all roots λ ’s of the equation det(∆(λ)) = 0 satisfy |arg(λ)| > π/2M . ∆(s) is called the characteristic
matrix and det(∆(s)) is called the characteristic polynomial of system (5.11) [51].
In case of α1 = α2 = · · · = αn = α, Fig. 5.2 shows the stable region for 0 < α < 1.
sliding-mode control, and reduces the chattering phenomenon
immensely just like FSMC, besides the proposed method regulates
the fuzzy rules automatically just like adaptive fuzzy control.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows: The basic of FC
is briefly reviewed in Sec. 2. In Sec. 3, the mathematical model of
ABS is introduced. The design procedure of sliding mode control-
ler based on fractional-order PDa sliding surface is described in
Sec. 4. The design procedure of AFFOSMC is described in detail
in Sec. 5. Simulation results are given in Sec. 6. Finally, the con-
cluding remarks are presented in Sec. 7.
2 The Basics of FC
2.1 Definitions of Fractional Derivative and Integral. FC is
a generalization of the integration and differentiation to a nonin-
teger order integrodifferential operator aD
a
t , where a and t are the
lower and upper limits and a(a  R) is the order of the operation







< að Þ > 0
1; < að Þ ¼ 0ðt
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where a is a complex number and <ðaÞ is the real part of a. There
are several definitions for fractional derivative. Gr€unwald-
Letnikor (GL), Riemann-Liouville (RL), and Caputo definitions
are commonly used. The GL definition [26] is
aD
a








f ðt jhÞ (2)




¼ C aþ 1
ð Þ
C jþ 1ð ÞC a jþ 1ð Þ (3)
with Gamma function C(). The RL definition [26] is
aD
a
t f tð Þ ¼
1








where n is the first integer which is not less than a, i.e.,
n 1 a< n. The Caputo definition [26] is given by
aD
a
t f tð Þ ¼
1
C n að Þ
ðt
a
f nð Þ sð Þ
t sð Þanþ1
ds (5)
In the analysis and design of control systems, Laplace trans-
form is a very popular tool. The Laplace transform of the RL frac-










t f ðtÞjt¼0 (6)
and the Laplace transform of the Caputo fractional derivative,









where Lfg denotes the Laplace operator. Therefore, under zero
initial conditions, the fractional integral operator with order a can
be represented by the transfer function F(s)¼ 1/sa in the fre-
quency domain.
2.2 Approximation of Fractional Derivative. In practice, it
is necessary to calculate the numerical solution of fractional sys-
tems described by fractional differential equations. However, it is
difficult to obtain the exact solution of fractional differential equa-
tions in most cases. Approximation methods were widely adopted
in practice. One popular approximation is done in frequency do-
main, in which the transfer functions involving fractional powers
of s are approximated with the usual (integer order) transfer func-
tions with a similar behavior. Other approximations were done
through numerical solution of fractional differential equations. In
Ref. [27], a numerical method for fractional differential equations
was proposed based on Adams–Bashforth–Moulton [28] type
predictor–corrector scheme. In this paper, a frequency approxima-
tion method by Oustaloup [8] is adopted. The Oustaloup approxi-
mation makes use of a recursive distribution of poles and zeroes.







  ; a > 0 (8)
where 2Nþ 1 is the number of poles and zeros chosen beforehand,
K is the gain that such that both sides of Eq. (8) shall have unit










 nþNþ 1það Þ=2
2Nþ1
(10)
In Eqs. (9) and (10), xb and xh are the lower and upper limits
of frequency of approximation, usually xbxh¼ 1, and thus,
K ¼ xah.
The case a< 0 can be handled by inverting Eq. (8). For jaj > 1,
the approximation becomes unsatisfactory; for that reason, it is
usual to split fractional powers of s like this
sa ¼ snsd; a ¼ nþ d; n 2 Z; d 2 ½0; 1 (11)
As a result, only the latter term has to be approximated.
2.3 Stability of Fractional-Order Systems. The stability of
fractional-order systems is of main i terest in control theory. This
issue h s been addressed by sever l authors. In Ref. [29], Matig-
non stated that the following autonomous system
0D
a
t x ¼ Ax; xð0Þ ¼ x0 (12)
where a is differential order, x  Rn and A  Rnn, are asymptoti-
cally stable if jargðeigðAÞÞj > ap=2. In this case, each component
of th states decays toward 0 ike ta. Also, this system is stable if
jargðeigðAÞÞj  ap=2 and those critical eigenvalues that satisfy
jargðeigðAÞÞj ¼ ap= ave geom t ic multiplicity one. Figure 1
shows the stable region for 0< a< 2. Obviously, the stable region
Fig. 1 Stability region of fractional system
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Fig. 5.2: Stability region of fractional system.
5.3.2 Controller Design
In the control design, the aim is to add a robust stabilizing controller on top of the normal
controller of the platoon in order to stabilize the platoon and prevent collisions. Without loss of
generality, the controller design procedure is described for 5-vehicle platoon where attacker is in the
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third position (5.12) and changes its gains from kd to k̃d.
ẋ1 = v1,
v̇1 = kp(x2 − x1 − d) + kd(v2 − v1),
ẋ2 = v2,
v̇2 = kp(x1 − x2 + d) + kp(x3 − x2 − d),
+ kd(v1 − v2) + kd(v3 − v2),
ẋ3 = v3,
v̇3 = kp(x2 − x3 + d) + kp(x4 − x3 − d),
+ k̃d(v2 − v3) + k̃d(v4 − v3),
ẋ4 = v4,
v̇4 = kp(x3 − x4 + d) + kp(x5 − x4 − d),




The proposed controller is applied to the vehicle under attacker’s control in order to tackle the
attacker effect on the platoon system,
ẋ1 = v1,
v̇1 = kp(x2 − x1 − d) + kd(v2 − v1),
ẋ2 = v2,
v̇2 = kp(x1 − x2 + d) + kp(x3 − x2 − d),
+ kd(v1 − v2) + kd(v3 − v2),
ẋ3 = v3,
v̇3 = kp(x2 − x3 + d) + kp(x4 − x3 − d),




v̇4 = kp(x3 − x4 + d) + kp(x5 − x4 − d),
+ kd(v3 − v4) + kd(v5 − v4),
ẋ5 = v5,
v̇5 = ul
The controller term is shown as Dv3 − kiDαv3 which includes a fractional order differentiator
and α (the differentiation order) is the design parameter. From (5.13), one can conclude
ẋ1 = v1,
v̇1 = kp(x2 − x1 − d) + kd(v2 − v1),
ẋ2 = v2,
v̇2 = kp(x1 − x2 + d) + kp(x3 − x2 − d),
+ kd(v1 − v2) + kd(v3 − v2),
ẋ3 = v3,
Dαv3 = kcp(x2 − x3 + d) + kcp(x4 − x3 − d),
+ k̃cd(v2 − v3) + k̃cd(v4 − v3),
(5.14)
ẋ4 = v4,
v̇4 = kp(x3 − x4 + d) + kp(x5 − x4 − d),
+ kd(v3 − v4) + kd(v5 − v4),
ẋ5 = v5,
v̇5 = ul
where kcp = kp/ki and kcd = k̃d/ki. Due to control law applied to the system (5.13), v̇3 involves
fractional order term in the closed loop system. In order to analyze the closed loop system stability,
considering α = p/q, system (5.14) can be rewritten as
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Dx1 = f1(x, v),
Dv1 = f2(x, v),
Dx2 = f3(x, v),
Dv2 = f4(x, v),
Dx3 = f5(x, v),
D(p/q)v3 = f6(x, v),
...
Dx5 = f9(x, v),
Dv5 = f10(x, v, ul).
(5.15)
It can be inferred that q is the lowest common multiple of the denominators in (5.15). According
to Theorem (1), and comparing (5.10) with (5.15), the equilibrium point of the system (5.15) is
asymptotically stable if:
|arg(λ)| > π/2q, (5.16)
for all roots λi s of (5.17),
det(diag([λq · · ·λp · · ·λq])− J) = 0, (5.17)
where
J = ∂f/∂x|x∗,v∗ ,
f =
[




By tuning the design parameter α, poles and zeros that were in the right half plane and causing
instability in the system, are now within the stable area for the fractional order system based on
Theorem (1) and Fig. 5.2. Hence, the closed loop system dynamics become stable. In other words,
by increasing flexibility in the tuning strategy, i.e. using fractional order differentiator to design
control input, the instability issue is fixed and collisions can be avoided.
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5.4 Simulation and Results
To demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed approach, a five-vehicle platoon with the
attacker at position three is considered. In simulation, gains of the controller are considered to be
kp = 1, kd = 3.3 and k̃d = −2, respectively. In Fig. 5.3, Fig. 5.4 and Fig. 5.5, the performances of
the platoon under attack are demonstrated. In Fig. 5.3, it is shown that collision happens among
all vehicles in the platoon. To provide more evident proof of collision in, Fig. 5.4, spacing between
vehicles (zi) are shown. Necessary and sufficient condition for the collision occurrence is presented
as (5.19),
zi ≤ 0. (5.19)
The oscillation in velocities of vehicles in the platoon resulting from successful destabilizing
attack are pointed out in Fig. 5.5.





















Fig. 5.3: Positions of the vehicles in 5-vehicle platoon under gain modification attack, when
the attacker is in the place three, without mitigation scheme.
Performance of the proposed mitigation scheme is evaluated in Fig. 5.6, Fig. 5.7 and Fig.
5.8. It is shown that the controller is able to prevent collisions. Positions of vehicles shown in
Fig. 5.6 clearly, demonstrate the efficiency of the control design. It can be seen that in the first 37
seconds after the attack, detection controller brings the attacker and its following vehicles to stop
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Fig. 5.4: Spacing between vehicles in 5-vehicle platoon under gain modification attack, when
the attacker is in the place three, without mitigation scheme.























Fig. 5.5: Velocities of the vehicles in 5-vehicle platoon under gain modification attack, when
the attacker is in the place three, without mitigation scheme.
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and platoon gradually recovers from the attack. Also, the attacker’s preceding vehicle slows down.
In this simulation leader of the platoon is not affected by other vehicles’ motion. Due to this cause,
the differences in spacings and velocities are justifiable. The mitigation scheme is able to protect the
platoon against undesirable effects of the attack, but the attacker can cause disruption in platoon
performance. Results show that after applying the mitigation controller, platoon becomes stable
and all vehicles are able to follow the leader.





















Fig. 5.6: Positions of the vehicles in 5-vehicle platoon under gain modification attack, when
the attacker is in the place three, with mitigation scheme.
5.5 Discussion
In this chapter, the fractional order differentiator (5.13) is applied to the vehicular platoon under
attack. The mitigation technique is applicable to the system after the detection of the attacker, and
the attacker is controlled through its front vehicle. As it is shown in (5.1), each vehicle’s inputs
are the states of the adjacent vehicle. The defender uses this link to inject the control input to
the attacker and control its motion. The proposed method performance is superior to the method
which isolates the attacker upon detection as it prevents the attacker to disintegrate the platoon.
The simulation results demonstrate that the proposed algorithm efficiently reduces the damages
and prevents collisions. The alternative approach can be taken based on detection of the attack,
not an attacker where similar control law (i.e. D(vi) − kiDαvi) can be applied to all vi equations
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Fig. 5.7: Spacing between vehicles in 5-vehicle platoon under gain modification attack, when
the attacker is in the place three, with mitigation scheme.























Fig. 5.8: Velocities of the vehicles in 5-vehicle platoon under gain modification attack, when
the attacker is in place three, with mitigation scheme.
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without prior knowledge of the attacker’s position. This implies that in the event of the attack and
its detection, all vehicles apply fractional order controller to the following vehicle.
5.6 Summary
In this chapter, a mitigation scheme to prevent an attacker from causing collisions in a vehicular
platoon under a gain modification attack is proposed. A control algorithm, based on fractional-order
calculus and using only local sensor information is shown to significantly alleviate the impact of the
attacker. The control is incorporated into the system when attacker(s) is(are) detected. It has
been proved that once the stream has been destabilized and its states continually deviate from the
desired trajectories, the attacker can be interrupted by another member of the platoon. Simulations
demonstrate that by applying the proposed control method, collisions are eliminated despite the




Conclusion and Future Work
6.1 Summary of This Work
This work is the first of its kind to investigate the security of the platooning system from the
control perspective in a comprehensive manner. First, the vulnerabilities of the existing upper-level
controller algorithms are identified, then the control modification attack targeting the stability and
string stability of the system under study is devised. Following that, the capabilities of the attacker
under actuator saturation and the reachable states of the platoon during the attack are studied. At
last, effective detection and mitigation algorithms are proposed.
The designed attack has been demonstrated that a vehicle with a modified control system,
operated by a maliciously minded actor, can destabilize a platoon employing a PD controller that
uses predecessor and follower distances and velocities to maintain a constant separation. This work
demonstrates the need for creators of future platooning control laws to consider the presence of an
adversary in the design process. Additionally, it has been proved that an attacker can theoretically
control the relative position and velocity of surrounding vehicles.
Reachability of platoon to determine feasible attacks with destructive impact is presented in
Chapter 3. The proposed approach provides new insight to the security of control in CPS, specifically
platooning. This method is proved that the attacker has a very limited capability to disrupt platoon,
only utilizing acceleration and deceleration when all vehicles in platoon follow normal control law.
Therefore, the attacker’s attempt would not result in severe damage and present control law has
proven to be robust to such attacks. On the other hand, when the attacker combines, the motion
modification and control law alteration, it can be shown that this type of attack is more disruptive
and can cause collisions between one to all vehicles. Although the attacker’s motion is bounded,
gain changing empowers attacker to create collisions with more physical damages in platoon.
In Chapter 4, the problem of detecting attackers in Cyber-Physical Systems under the gain
modification or destabilizing attack is addressed. This algorithm is capable of distinguishing the
misbehaving units by identifying corresponding parameters and differentiating them from the normal
group of parameters using the basic machine learning algorithm. Using the presented scheme, it can
be distinguished which subsystems are compromised. The proposed method does not require prior
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knowledge of the number of attackers or the system’s parameters. This results are highly applicable
to attack detection in CPS. A case study of compromised CPS, vehicle platooning in adversarial
environment, is presented to evidence the efficiency of the proposed strategy. In vehicular platooning,
where attackers alter their gains to different values than the normal set of gains, the detection
algorithm is capable of pinpointing all attackers. This goal can be achieved by using position and
velocity of the vehicle in-front as the inputs and the vehicle’s own position and velocity as the
outputs to identify each vehicle’s control parameters. The infrastructure, which has access to all
measurements is responsible for the algorithm implementation. Then, victims can be separated
from malicious actors utilizing the thresholding method or classifiers. Vehicle Platooning example
illustrates that the presented detection scheme successfully identifies all attackers participating in
the attack scenario in a small time window after the attack and more importantly, detection is
accurate.
A fractional order control scheme is designed in Chapter 5 for collision avoidance in adversarial
platooning environment. Proposed fractional order calculus-based technique is applied to attacker’s
vehicle through the vehicle in front of the attacker. The main purpose in the control design is to
stabilize platoon after the attacker destabilizes system through gain modification attack. Simulation
results show that the proposed scheme can effectively eliminate the collisions caused by the attacker.
The mitigation algorithm is capable of preventing damages and stopping undesired impacts of the
attack in a timely manner. This approach is mainly based on attacker detection and is applied to
the platoon under attack after attacker identification. While the approach is effective in protecting
platoon against damages, platoon falls short in recovering and returning to the normal performance
regarding constant spacing and zero relative velocity.
6.2 Future Works
Future work will focus on the designing of countermeasures, including the possible use of dy-
namic gain scheduling for vehicles in a platoon. It is hoped that by obfuscating the exact gains
of other vehicles, an attacker would be prevented from calculating their own gain to achieve reso-
nance. Furthermore, the performance of the controller and platoon in presence of adversary will be
improved. Also the susceptibility of platooning/platooning-like laws that rely only on predecessor
information and/or employ communication to relay information (e.g. adaptive and cooperative adap-
tive cruise control systems), which are already present in or are under development for, commercial
systems will be examined. Moreover, the impacts of the attacks in different attack scenarios like
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Transfer functions for string instability
A.1 Calculation of the Transfer functions
Following the procedure set forth in Section 2.3.1 for an attacker in the second position gives
the error transfer functions





∣∣∣∣ , · · · , |Gi(s))| = ∣∣∣∣ g31−Gi−1g3





while for the third position





∣∣∣∣ , |G4(s)| = ∣∣∣∣ g31−G3g3
∣∣∣∣ , · · · ,
|Gi(s)| =
∣∣∣∣ g31−Gi−1g3
∣∣∣∣ , · · · , |Gn−2(s)| = ∣∣∣∣ g31−Gn−3g3
∣∣∣∣
(A.2)
For an attacker in the jth position where j = [4, n− 2] we have
|Gn−j(s)| =
∣∣∣∣ g11−Gn−4g2
∣∣∣∣ , |Gn+1−j(s)| = ∣∣∣∣ g21−Gn−3g1
∣∣∣∣
otherwise |Gi(s)| =
∣∣∣ g31−Gi−1g3 ∣∣∣ and |G1(s)| = |g3|.
Finally, for an attacker at the nth-1 position, the system transfer functions are
|G1(s)| = |g3| , |G2(s)| =
∣∣∣∣ g31−G1g3
∣∣∣∣ , · · · ,
|Gi(s)| =
∣∣∣∣ g31−Gi−1g3
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